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THE INFLUENCE OF ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES
ON INCORPORATION CHOICE: EVIDENCE ON THE
"RACE" DEBATE AND ANTITAKEOVER OVERREACHING
GUHAN SUBRAMANIAN'
Commentators have long debated whether competition among states for
corporate charters represents a race to the top or a race to the bottom. Race-to-
the-top advocates recently have gained ground in this debate on the basis of the
general corporate migration to Delaware in the 1990s and empirical evidence
suggesting that Delaware incorporation increases shareholder wealth. This Ar-
ticle uses second-generation state antitakeover statutes to shed additional light
on this debate. I use a new database of reincorporations from the 1990s to
show that managers generally migrate to (and fail to migrate away from) typi-
cal antitakeover statutes. Given the robust econometric evidence that these
statutes increase managerial agency costs and reduce shareholder wealth, my
results are generally consistent with the race-to-the-bottom view. However, I also
find some evidence that managers migrate away from the more severe antitake-
over statutes in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, through incorpora-
tion choice and opt-out from these statutes. This finding introduces the possi-
bility of "overreaching" in the corporate charter marketplace and suggests
potential limits on the race to the bottom. The results have implications for re-
cent developments in corporate charter competition in both the United States
and the European Union.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most important questions in U.S. corporate law is
whether competition in the corporate charter market represents a
"race to the top" or a "race to the bottom." The answer has implica-
tions for whether and to what extent federal legislation should pre-
empt state corporate law. Ralph Winter,1 Frank Easterbrook, Daniel
Fischel, and Roberta Romano4 have argued that states compete
I See Ralph K. Winter, Jr., State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corpo-
ration, 6J. LEGAL STUD. 251, 251-52 (1977) (concluding that "state corporate legal sys-
tems are protective of shareholders and that state regulation is generally preferable to
federal").
2 See Frank H. Easterbrook, Managers'Discretion and Investors' Welfare: Theories and
Evidence, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 540, 542 (1984) (discussing "some of the ways in which
competition... induces managers to act in the interests of investors, even if each in-
vestor is powerless"); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Voting in Corporate Law,
26J.L. & ECON. 395, 398 (1983) (arguing that "states' legal rules generally provide in-
vestors with the sort of voting arrangements they would find desirable if contracts
could be arranged and enforced at low cost").
3 See Daniel R. Fischel, From MITE to CTS: State Anti-Takeover Statutes, the Williams
Act, the Commerce Clause, and Insider Trading, 1987 Sup. CT. REV. 47, 84 ("States that en-
act laws that are harmful to investors will cause entrepreneurs to incorporate else-
where."); Daniel R. Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Devel-
opments in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 NW. U. L. REV. 913, 919-20 (1982) (attributing
Delaware's preeminence to its success in a "climb to the top" in which shareholders'
wealth is maximized, rather than minimized); supra note 2 (citing a work co-authored
with Frank Easterbrook).
4 See ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAw 16 (1993)
[hereinafter ROMANO, GENIUS] (stating that "the evidence supports the view that states
do compete for the chartering business" and that this "benefits rather than harms
shareholders"); Roberta Romano, A Guide to Takeovers: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation,
9 YALEJ. ON REG. 119, 119 (1992) (demonstrating that state choices among takeover
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against each other to offer laws that maximize shareholder value, re-
sulting in a race to the top. William Cary,5 Lucian Bebchuk, Alma
Cohen,7 Allen Ferrell," and (in the political arena) Ralph Nader have
argued that states cater to managers, whose self-interest often can di-
verge from the interests of shareholders, resulting in a race to the bot-
tom at least with respect to certain issues.
Commentators on both sides of the debate have noted that their'
opposing views in fact share fundamental assumptions about the social
welfare goal (maximization of shareholder wealth), the states' objec-
tive (maximization of incorporation revenue), and managers' decision
rule (pursuit of self-interest).10 The two views differ only in their as-
sessment of managers' ability to pursue private benefits of control.
statutes can benefit shareholders); Roberta Romano, Competition for Corporate Charters
and the Lesson of Takeover Statutes, 61 FORDHAM L. REV. 843, 847 (1993) [hereinafter
Romano, Lesson] ("While state competition is an imperfect public policy instrument,
on balance it benefits investors."); Roberta Romano, Law as a Product. Some Pieces of the
Incorporation Puzzle, I J.L. ECON. & ORG. 225, 272-73 (1985) [hereinafter Romano, Some
Pieces] (finding statistical support that reincorporation "is associated, in some situa-
tions, with positive abnormal returns for the shareholders").
5 See William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections upon Delaware, 83
YALE L.J. 663, 705 (1974) (describing "this race for the bottom, with Delaware in the
lead").
6 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Federalism and the Corporation: The Desirable Limits on
State Competition in Corporate Law, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1435, 1440 (1992) (arguing that
"state competition produces a race for the top with respect to some corporate issues
but a race for the bottom with respect to others"); Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen, &
Allen Ferrell, Does the Evidence Favor State Competition in Corporate Law?, 90 CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 2, on file with author) ("[S]tate competition in-
duces states to provide rules that managers, but not necessarily shareholders, favor
with respect to corporate law issues that significantly affect managers' private benefits
of control .. "); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, A New Approach to Takeover Law
and Regulatory Competition, 87 VA. L. REV. 111, 130 (2001) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Fer-
rell, A New Approach] (arguing that "state competition produces a systematic tendency
for states to protect incumbent management excessively from takeovers"); Lucian Arye
Bebchuk & Allen Ferrell, Federalism and Corporate Law: The Race to Protect Managers from
Takeovers, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1168 (1999) [hereinafter Bebchuk & Ferrell, Federalism]
(using takeover law to demonstrate that state competition suffers from shortcomings
that are unlikely to lead to shareholder wealth maximization); Lucian Bebchuk &
Alma Cohen, Firms' Decisions Where to Incorporate 5 (Feb. 2002) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author) ("[T]he more protection from takeovers a state pro-
vides, the more successful it is in the market for incorporations.").
7 Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, supra note 6; Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6.
8 Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, supra note 6; Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach,
supra note 6; Bebchuk & Ferrell, Federalism, supra note 6.
9See RALPH NADER, MARK GREEN, & JOEL SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT
CORPORATION 60 (1976) ("The entire function of state corporate law has been re-
duced to reflecting the preferences of the managers of the target corporations.").
10 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1456; Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 228.
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Race-to-the-top proponents argue that managers are to a large extent
prevented from pursuing their self-interest to the detriment of share-
holders by marketplace discipline-notably the capital market, the
product market, and the market for corporate control. Race-to-the-
bottom proponents argue that these forces do not effectively constrain
managers.
In the 1970s, the race-to-the-bottom view held sway. In 1976, for
example, Richard Jennings stated that the race-to-the-bottom view was
"common knowledge,"" and a year later Winter stated that "[i]t is al-
most universally the opinion of academic commentators that state
corporation codes do not impose sufficiently stringent controls on
corporate management and are lax in protecting shareholders."" Yet
in the 1980s and 1990s commentators documented the many benefits
of Delaware incorporation and argued that the growing tide of rein-
corporations to Delaware was evidence against a race to the bottom.
3
This argument gained empirical validation through the recent work of
Robert Daines, who provided evidence that Delaware firms have
higher Tobin's Qs than non-Delaware firms.14 By the mid-to-late 1990s
the conventional wisdom among academic commentators had shifted
to the race-to-the-top view. In 1995, Michael Klausner stated that
"there is broad consensus that state competition to produce corporate
law is a race to (or at least toward) the top.,"'5 In 2000, Jill Fisch re-
ported that "[m] ost corporate law scholars ... align themselves with
1 Richard W. Jennings, Federalization of Corporate Law: Part Way or All the Way, 31
Bus. LAw. 991 (1976).
12 Winter, supra note 1, at 251. For example, in June 1976, eighty law professors
signed a letter endorsing a role for the national government in corporate law. Letter
from David L. Chambers, Professor of Law, The University of Michigan Law School, to
United States Senate Committee on Commerce (June 1976), cited in Romano, Lesson,
supra note 4, at 847 n.14; see also MarkJ. Loewenstein, Delaware as Demon: Twenty-Five
Years After Professor Cary's Polemic, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 497, 499 (2000) ("Professor
Cary's [race-to-the-bottom] article received a generally warm reception .... ").
1 See, e.g., Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 279-81 (discussing characteristics
of the corporate charter market that influence the migration of corporations to Dela-
ware); Demetrios G. Kaouris, Note, Is Delaware Still a Haven for Incorporation?, 20 DEL. J.
CORP. L. 965, 1011 (1995) (concluding that Delaware retains its advantage over other
states because of the "combination of its flexible corporate code, the responsiveness of
its legislature, the wealth of legal precedent, its efficient and knowledgeable court sys-
tem, and its business-like Secretary of State's Office").
14 See Robert Daines, Does Delaware Law Improve Firm Value?, 62 J. FIN. ECON. 525,
533, 555 (finding that Delaware firms were worth 5% more in 1996, on average, and
received more takeover bids than firms incorporated elsewhere).
15 Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 VA. L.
REv. 757, 842 (1995).
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Winter."1 6 This consensus represents a dramatic turn from the "almost
universal[]" endorsement of the race-to-the-bottom view two decades
earlier.
1 7
Along with contemporaneous work by Bebchuk and Cohen, 8 this
Article takes a new approach to assess the nature of competition in the
corporate charter marketplace. The starting point for the analysis is
the wave of antitakeover statutes that were passed by a majority of
states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Econometric analyses of these
statutes consistently find that they reduce shareholder wealth; the
most common explanation is the expectation (whether correct or
not)'9 that such statutes reduce the likelihood of a takeover and hence
reduce the likelihood of a takeover premium for shareholders. Anti-
takeover statutes also seem to increase managerial agency costs at an
operational level."0
These findings from the financial economics literature provide
the opportunity for a relatively clean empirical test: do managers mi-
grate to or away from antitakeover statutes? Race-to-the-top theorists
predict that managers will migrate away from such statutes.2' Race-to-
the-bottom theorists predict that managers will migrate to such stat-
utes. Examining managers' response to antitakeover statutes, then,
focuses squarely on the critical question-the question on which the
16 Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1065 (2000); see also Roberta Romano, The State Com-
petition Debate in Corporate Law, 8 CARDOzO L. REV. 709, 711 (1987) ("Winter's critique
is devastating to Cary's analysis because Cary completely overlooked the interaction of
markets on managers' incentives.").
17 See Ralph K. Winter, Foreword to ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at xiii (describ-
ing Romano's work as "a major event in an intellectual revolution").
18 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6.
19 See Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Effect
of Takeover Defenses (May 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (find-
ing no evidence that state antitakeover statutes deter takeover bids).
20 See, e.g., MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN, CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE AND EXECUTIVE PAY: EVIDENCE FROM TAKEOVER LEGISLATION 4 (Mass.
Inst. Tech., Working Paper, 1999) (finding that executive pay increases in firms newly
covered by certain antitakeover statutes); MARIANNE BERTRAND & SENDHIL
MULLAINATHAN, ENJOYING THE QUIET LIFE? MANAGERIAL BEHAVIOR FOLLOWING ANTI-
TAKEOVER LEGISLATION (Mass. Inst. Tech., Working Paper, 2000) (finding that busi-
ness combination statutes lead to a decrease in plant-level efficiency); Gerald T. Garvey
& Gordon Hanka, Capital Structure and Corporate Control: The Effect of Antitakeover Stat-
utes on Firm Leverage, 54J. FIN. 519, 526-27 (1999) (finding that firms in states with anti-
takeover statutes have lower leverage).
21 See, e.g., Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 859 tbl.1 (finding that the majority of
firms opted out of Pennsylvania's 1990 Takeover Statute).
22 See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1467-70.
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debate turns-as to whether managers can pursue private benefits of
control to the detriment of shareholders.
Using a large sample of U.S. public companies, I find evidence
that managers generally migrate to antitakeover statutes. Specifically,
I find that managers of public companies are 26% more likely to re-
main in their headquarters state (instead of incorporating in Delaware
or in a third state) if the headquarters state has a control share acqui-
sition statute, a business combination statute, and a pill validation
statute, the three statutes often thought to be the most important
among the typical "second generation" state antitakeover statutes. I
also find that fair price statutes, which do not seem to reduce share-
holder value, also do not seem to influence the incorporation deci-
sion. Thus, managers migrate to antitakeover statues that are gener-
ally thought to reduce shareholder value, and are not influenced by
antitakeover statutes that do not. These results continue to hold when
I examine the flow of reincorporations from the 1990s rather than the
stock of incorporations in 2000. Viewed as a whole, these results are
generally consistent with the race-to-the-bottom view.
However, closer analysis of the most potent antitakeover statutes-
in Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, and Ohio-suggests limits on this
view. I find some evidence that managers migrate away from these
statutes, both through their incorporation decisions and through opt-
out. This finding suggests potential limitations on managers' ability to
entrench themselves, perhaps due to the emergence of institutional
shareholder activism in the 1990s, and suggests that these three states
may have "overreached" in the corporate charter marketplace.
In general, these results support the view that the federal govern-
ment should play a greater role in providing corporate law for U.S.
public companies. 23 They also suggest that recent movements in the
European Union toward greater competition for corporate charters
among member states may be misguided. Finally, these results have
counterintuitive implications for one specific development in the U.S.
corporate charter marketplace. Race-to-the-bottom theorists point to
Maryland's Unsolicited Takeover Act of 1999-by far the most potent
antitakeover statute that has appeared to date-as the latest and most
extreme manifestation of their view. Yet the empirical evidence from
the experience in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts suggests that
23 E.g., NADER, GREEN, & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 70-71 (arguing that federal
chartering control is necessary to "contain the excessive power and costs of corporate
power"); Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 151-55 (highlighting the
reasons why federal intervention is necessary in the area of takeover law).
1802 UNIVERSYFY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAWPREVIEW [Vol. 150: 1795
Maryland may have overreached.
The remainder of this Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides
background information on the corporate charter marketplace and
reviews the prior literature. Part II presents basic descriptive statistics.
Part III presents the methodology and results from the empirical tests.
Part IV examines the experience of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massa-
chusetts, three states with potent antitakeover statutes. Part V pro-
vides implications of these results for recent developments in the
United States and in the European Union.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Competition in the Corporate Charter Market
U.S. corporations are governed by their state of incorporation, re-
gardless of the location of their headquarters or where they conduct
their business. Corporations are not constrained by their headquar-
ters, location of manufacturing facilities, place of business, or other
24operational factors in deciding where to incorporate. Moreover, re-
incorporation from one state to another is relatively inexpensive,25 and
typically qualifies as a tax-free reorganization under § 368(a) of the
U.S. tax code.26 The most important constraint on reincorporations is
24 Cf Aspen Technology Inc. Proxy Statement 10 (Dec. 1, 1997) ("The Reincorpo-
ration [from Massachusetts to Delaware] will not result in any change in the Com-
pany's business, assets or liabilities, will not cause its corporate headquarters to be
moved and will not result in any relocation of management or other employees."),
available at http://www.sec.gov/Archive/edgar/data/929940/0000950135-97-
004822.txt.
25 See Romano, Some Pieces, supra note at 4, at 246 (finding "a typical cost of ap-
proximately $40,000" for reincorporation in 1985, equivalent to approximately $70,000
in 2001). Admittedly, this figure captures only the cost of reincorporations that occur,
leaving open the possibility that other reincorporations are deterred due to cost.
Note, however, that reincorporation costs are one-time costs, while benefits are ongo-
ing. Assuming a 10% discount rate, for example, a company would only need to find
$7,000 of ongoing annual benefit (e.g., from higher-quality corporate law) in order to
cost.ustify the typical reincorporation expense.
f, If the reincorporation qualifies as a § 368 reorganization, shareholders do not
recognize any gain or loss on their shares and carry over their basis in the old shares to
the new shares. I.R.C. §§ 354, 368(a) (1994). Moreover, holders of restricted shares
can typically tack the holding period of their shares for purposes of Rule 144, which
governs sales of restricted securities. Alan K. Austin & Gregory M. Priest, Resales of Se-
curities Under Rule 144 and Rule 144A, in SECURITIES FILINGS 1999, at 65, 80 (1999). In
contrast, under current law reincorporation in the European Union typically requires
a liquidation of the company, Karsten Engsig Sorensen & Mette Neville, Corporate Mi-
gration in the European Union, 6 COLUM.J. EUR. L. 181, 185 (2000), though this rule may
be changing, see infra Part V.C (noting two recent developments in this area that may
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procedural rather than economic: because corporations generally re-
incorporate by merging into a new company that is incorporated in
the destination state, and because mergers generally require board
authorization and shareholder approval," managers (and the board)
cannot reincorporate on their own, nor can shareholders propose re-
incorporations on their own.
States compete to have companies incorporated within their
boundaries in order to maximize their corporate charter revenues."'
New Jersey was the original leader in this market, 9 but lost its lead to
open the door for U.S.-style charter competition).
27 See ROBERT CHARLES CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 10.2.4 (1986) (describing
shareholder approval requirements for mergers). Depending on pre-reincorporation
state law and the company's pre-reincorporation charter, approval of the merger may
require a supermajority vote by shareholders. Compare Data Translation Inc.
Proxy Statement (Mar. 8, 1996) (two-thirds approval), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webuser.htm, and Aspen Technology
Inc. Proxy Statement 9 (Dec. 1, 1997) (same), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webuser.htm, with Touchstone Software
Corp. Proxy Statement (Nov. 12, 1996) (simple majority approval), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webuser.htm, and Worthington Industries
Proxy Statement 8 (August 20, 1998) (same), available at
http://www.sec.gov/edgar/searchedgar/webuser.htm.
28 This is a fundamental assumption of both the race-to-the-top and race-to-the-
bottom views. Nevertheless, some commentators have questioned whether states other
than Delaware truly compete in this marketplace. See Ralph K. Winter, The "Race for the
Top" Revisited: A Comment on Eisenberg, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 1526, 1529 (1989) (arguing
that "the race to the top may be slow because Delaware is the only state devoted exclu-
sively to maximizing franchise taxes"); Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, The Myth of
State Competition in Corporate Law 1 (2002) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author) [hereinafter Kahan & Kamar, Myth] ("[O]ther than Delaware, no state has
made significant and sustained efforts to attract incorporations."). Others have
pointed out that Delaware's dominant position makes perfect competition in this mar-
ketplace a dubious proposition. See Marcel Kahan & Ehud Kamar, Price Discrimination
in the Market for Corporate Law, 86 CORNELL L. REv. 1205, 1210-14 (2001) [hereinafter
Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination] (arguing that the market for incorporations is not
perfectly competitive because Delaware has competitive advantages that give it market
power); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate Law,
98 COLUM. L. REv. 1908, 1911-12 (1998) (describing the corporate law regulation
market as "imperfect competition"); Klausner, supra note 15, at 846-47 (discussing the
role of network externalities in preserving Delaware's dominance in the incorporation
marketplace). Anecdotal evidence suggests that states attempt to compete in this mar-
ket, see, e.g., Keith Paul Bishop, The Delaware of the West: Does Nevada Offer Better Treat-
ment for Directors?, INSIGHTS, Mar. 1993, at 20, 20 ("In recent years .... Nevada has
amended its corporate law in a rather obvious effort to entice management into mak-
ing Nevada its corporate home."), and this Article provides evidence that competition
in the corporate charter market is actually more vibrant than prior commentators have
suggested, infra Figures 3 & 4.
SeeJoel Seligman, A Brief History of Delaware's General Corporation Law of 1899, 1
DEL. J. CORP. L. 249, 265-68 (1976) (discussing the series of statutes enacted between
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Delaware after making restrictive amendments to its corporate law in
1913. ° Delaware quickly gained a dominant share and never looked
back: by 1965, 35% of companies listed on the New York Stock Ex-
change (NYSE) were Delaware companies; 31 by 1973 this number had
risen to 40%;32 and by 2000 approximately half of NYSE companies
were incorporated in Delaware.33 Among firms overall, Delaware in
the 1990s had achieved a dominant share of the existing corporate
charter market (50%), the reincorporation market (54%), and the
IPO charter market (approximately 60%) .3 Delaware's dominance is
an important stylized fact in the "race" debate described below.
B. A Brief Survey of the Debate
The modem "race" debate started with William Cary's now-famous
1974 article in the Yale Law Journal.3 Starting from the premise that
Delaware's sole interest was maximizing its incorporation revenues,'6
Cary highlighted a series of issues on which the Delaware legislature
and courts had catered to managers' interests at the expense of
1891 and 1896 that made NewJersey a success in "the charter-mongering business").
30 Id. at 270-71.
31 See Cary, supra note 5, at 671 (citing GEORGE C. SEWARD, BAsIc CORPORATE
PRACTICE 5 (1966)).
32 See id. at 671 (citing the New York Stock Exchange Directory dated January 5,
1973, at pages 701-851).
3 Delaware Division of Corporations, at http://www.state.de.us/corp/index.htm
(last visited Apr. 27, 2002).
34 Infra Part II.B.2.
35 Cary, supra note 5.
36 See id. at 668, 684 ("Stimulating incorporation in Delaware has some of the fla-
vor of a community chest drive.... Perhaps there is no public policy left in Delaware
corporate law except the objective of raising revenue."). Delaware's actions were "un-
derstandabl[e]" because of the state's heavy dependence on corporate charter reve-
nues. Id. at 668. At the time of Cary's writing, Delaware's incorporation revenues rep-
resented nearly 23% of the total tax collections for the state. See Cary, supra note 5, at
669 (reporting $52 million in corporate franchise taxes in 1971, out of a total of $222
million in state tax collections for Delaware). However, 1971 appears to have been the
high point of Delaware's dependency on franchise revenues. Romano calculates that
the ratio dropped to 19% in 1972, and averaged approximately 16% over the period
1960-1990. ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 7-8. More recently, Kahan and Kamar
report $424.4 million of corporate charter revenues for Delaware in 1999, representing
19% of Delaware's total tax base. Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 28, at
1251 tbl.3. Including related fees, the corporate charter industry may contribute as
much as one-quarter of Delaware's total budget. See Albert B. Crenshaw, Delaware Inc.,
WASH. POST, May 7, 2000, at HI (calculating nearly $475 million in incorporation fees
plus "other spending from the lawyers and experts needed when companies register,
litigate, merge, and, sometimes, fail").
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shareholders. 7 Cary then argued that other states would be forced to
compete with Delaware in a "race for the bottom."' States would de-
velop competing corporate codes that favored managers' interests, but
that did not maximize value for shareholders. 9 The solution, Cary be-
lieved, was federalization of substantial portions of corporate law
rather than leaving it to the states.4°
In an equally influential article published three years later, Ralph
Winter responded to Cary's assessment with the argument that capital
markets, product markets, and the market for corporate control
would provide an effective check against a race to the bottom.4 1 If
Delaware companies allowed managers to exploit shareholders sys-
tematically while other states did not, shareholders in Delaware com-
panies would earn lower returns than shareholders in companies
chartered in other states.42 Investors would pay less for the stock of
Delaware companies. Delaware companies would face a higher cost of
capital, which would make it difficult for them to compete in product
markets. Eventually, Delaware companies would be taken over by ac-
quirers who would increase shareholder value simply by reincorporat-
ing to another state. To avoid this sequence of events, Delaware (and
other states) would compete against each other in a "race for the top"
to develop rules that maximized shareholder value. 3
In response to Winter and others, Bebchuk argued that state
competition is unlikely to work well with respect to issues that are
"'significantly redistributive"' and that "directly implicate the strength
of market discipline" (notably antitakeover statutes) . Bebchuk and
Ferrell advocate "choice-enhancing federal intervention" as a re-
sponse to this perceived structural flaw in the corporate charter mar-
ketplace.45
At the other end of the policy spectrum from Bebchuk, Romano
37 See Cary, supra note 5, at 672-84 (citing issues such as duty of care, proxy con-
tests, takeovers, and fairness between parent and subsidiary).
38 Id. at 705.
39 Id. at 665-66.
40 Id. at 700-03.
41 Winter, supra note 1, at 256.
42 Id. at 257.
43 Id.
44 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1461-70; see also Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 530
(arguing that the disciplining effect of the market for corporate control "assumes an
active, unencumbered market for takeovers, an assumption that is simply counterfac-
tual").
45 Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 149-56.
1806 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1795
points to Delaware's relatively moderate takeover statute as evidence
that the general migration to Delaware is not a race to the bottom.46
Moreover, she reports that a large fraction of Pennsylvania firms
opted out of the Pennsylvania antitakeover statute after it was passed
in 1991: out of 308 firms incorporated in Pennsylvania in that year,
17% opted out completely, another 25% opted out of certain provi-
sions, and only 23% did not opt out at all (another 35% were uniden-
tified) .4  Romano concludes from this analysis that "Pennsylvania's
disgorgement statute provides a good example of the beneficent ef-
fect of state competition.... The large-scale withdrawal by Pennsylva-
nia firms from inclusion under a value-decreasing statute is powerful
support for the acuity of Winter's insight in his critique of Cary."4 s
Other views have been put forward as well. Bernard Black argues
that corporate law generally does not matter and that choice of domi-
cile is therefore unimportant.49 As a partial response, the evidence
presented in this Article suggests that managers at least act as if state
antitakeover statutes matter.50 Macey and Miller,5' Carney, and Brat-
ton and McCahery5 3 use variations of an "interest group" lens to high-
46 Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 855-56.
47 Id. at 859 tbl.I.
48 Id. at 858-59. Such is the strength (and consistency) of Romano's belief in the
benefits of state competition that in subsequent work she advocates delegating many
aspects of federal securities law back to the states. See Roberta Romano, Empowering
Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation, 107 YALE LJ. 2359, 2361 (1998)
("This Article contends that the current legislative approach to securities regulation is
mistaken .... [This Article] advocates instead a market-oriented approach of competi-
tive federalism that would expand, not reduce, the role of the states in securities regu-
lation.").
49 See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 Nw. U. L. REv. 542, 593 (1990) (expounding his "triviality hypothesis that, with lim-
ited exceptions for changes in law and the benefits and costs of paternalism, state cor-
porate law is trivial").
50 Infra Parts III-IV; see alsoJohn C. Coates, IV & Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side
Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. L. REv. 307, 319-37 (2000) (pre-
senting large-sample evidence that important Delaware decisions on M&A lockups in-
fluence practitioners in their choice of deal protection device).
51 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of
Delaware Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REv. 469 (1987) (arguing that states exploit the cor-
porate agency relationship by offering less efficient rules that are nevertheless attrac-
tive to management).
52 See WilliamJ. Carney, The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 715, 716
(1998) (using an "interest group theory to explain why states may attempt to compete
with Delaware," and exploring the two interest groups of "local corporate lawyers and
managers of firms incorporated within a state" that benefit from modern corporate
laws).
53 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory
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light the importance of various constituencies (management, courts,
lawyers, etc.) in preserving Delaware's dominance. In doing so these
studies generally reach a middle-ground view on the race debate. 4
C. Econometric Evidence
Though event studies offer relatively consistent results on the race
debate, these studies suffer from methodological flaws that make their
results difficult to interpret. Among seven event studies of reincorpo-
rations, five find positive abnormal returns, 55 and two more find mixed
56results.
The event study methodology is problematic in the particular con-
text of reincorporations because companies often announce changes
in strategy, or additional takeover defense mechanisms, or both, in
conjunction with the reincorporation decision. As just one example,
Foothill Independent Bancorp's reincorporation from California to
Delaware in March 2000 was accompanied by the elimination of cu-
Capture, and Corporate Self-Regulation, 73 N.C. L. REV. 1861 (1995) (describing charter
competition as an example of regulatory capture by corporate management).
See id. at 1948 ("State law remains the best vehicle for realizing those possibili-
ties [for productive firm contracting], but a demand-side barrier prevents state law ex-
perimentation."); Carney, supra note 52, at 720, 722 ("Two interest groups have domi-
nated the development of American corporate law-corporate lawyers and corporate
managers.... This does not mean, however, that corporate law changes necessarily
operate to the disadvantage of shareholders.").
55 See Michael Bradley & Cindy A. Schipani, The Relevance of the Duty of Care Stan-
dard in Corporate Governance, 75 IowA L. REv. 1, 67 (1989) (finding a 6.2% cumulative
abnormal return in the window of thirty to ten days before shareholders received
proxy materials describing the reincorporation); Peter Dodd & Richard Leftwich, The
Market for Corporate Charters: "Unhealthy Competition" Versus Federal Regulation, 53 J. Bus.
259, 274-75 (1980) (finding positive abnormal returns in the twenty-four-month period
before the reincorporation); Allen Hyman, The Delaware Controversy-The Legal Debate, 4
DEL.J. CoRp. L. 368, 385-87, 396 tbl.1, 397 tbl.2 (1979) (finding positive abnormal re-
turns in the days and weeks surrounding the announcement of reincorporation to
Delaware); Jeffry Netter & Annette Poulsen, State Corporation Laws and Shareholders: The
Recent Experience, 18 FIN. MGMT. 29, 36 (1989) ("The cumulative abnormal returns for
the Delaware firms are positive.... ."); Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 271-72
(finding significant positive abnormal returns in a ten-day window around the reincor-
poration for a portfolio of all reincorporating firms, and even more so for firms rein-
corporating for acquisition purposes).
56 See Randall A. Heron & Wilbur G. Lewellen, An Empirical Analysis of the Reincorpo-
ration Decision, 33 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIvE ANALYSIS 549 (1998) (finding positive ab-
normal returns for reincorporations that establish limits on director liability and nega-
tive abnormal returns for reincorporations that erect takeover defenses); Pamela P.
Peterson, Reincorporation: Motives and Shareholder Wealth, 23 FIN. REV. 151, 159-60
(1988) (finding positive abnormal returns unless the reincorporation increases take-
over defenses).
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mulative voting, a doubling of the number of authorized shares of
common stock, the creation of a new class of blank-check preferred
stock, and the installation of a staggered board of directors.57 It would
be difficult if not impossible to isolate the market response to rein-
corporation when these other changes are being made simultane-
ously. Bebchuk argues that managers may have incentives to time
their reincorporation decision with the release of other positive news
in order to mask the negative impact of the reincorporation. 8 More
generally, most commentators acknowledge that reincorporating
companies are not a random draw of all companies, and that reincor-
poration may be endogenous to firm performance.59 Thus, event
studies of reincorporations do not provide a clean test, and studies
finding positive abnormal returns may be picking up other effects.
In the most recent econometric contribution to this debate, Rob-
ert Daines takes a different approach. Daines uses Tobin's Q as an es-
timate of firm value and finds that Delaware firms are worth signifi-
cantly more than firms incorporated elsewhere. 6° Daines further finds
that Delaware firms are more likely to attract takeover bids than com-
panies in other states.6' In view of the well-accepted finding that take-
overs increase returns for target shareholders, he argues that the in-
creased likelihood of takeover in Delaware is at least partially
responsible for the higher Q-ratios that he finds. 6' Daines concludes
from this evidence that Delaware is "not lead[ing] in a national 'race
to the bottom.'
6 3
Bebchuk and Ferrell respond to Daines with the observation that
firm quality may be endogenous to the incorporation decision. 64 They
hypothesize that Daines may be capturing a selection effect having lit-
tle to do with the quality of Delaware law, though they present no evi-
dence in support of this view and acknowledge that Daines has made
57 Brenda L. Moore, Foothill Independent Bancorp Seeks to Ward Off Any Future Take-
over, WALL ST.J. (California ed.), Mar. 15, 2000, at C2.
58 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1449 & n.60.
59 See, e.g., Daines, supra note 14, at 527 ("Because reincorporations are not a ran-
dom sample of firms, event studies of reincorporating firms do not tell us about the




62 Id. at 528.
63 Id.
64 Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 137-38.
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"considerable effort" to control for this possibility.65 Bar-Gill, Barzuza,
66
and Bebchuk provide a theoretical response to Daines. They con-
struct a model showing, first, that Delaware companies will reap bene-
fits from Delaware's legal infrastructure and from network external-
ities, and second, that Delaware has incentives to charge below the full
benefit that these firms reap in order to discourage other states from
challenging its dominance. 6' This underpricing of Delaware corpo-
rate law could fully explain the higher Tobin's Qs that Daines reports.
In current work; I find that Delaware firms had consistently higher
Tobin's Q in the early 1990s, confirming Daines's result'for this pe-
riod, but the magnitude of this effect diminishes over time and seems
to disappear entirely by the mid-to-late 1990s.68 This finding is not in-
consistent with Daines's itself, which ends its sample in 1996 and finds
that results for the last two years (1995 and 1996) are not statistically
significant at 95% confidence. 69 Nevertheless, commentators have as-
sumed its robustness-one prominent Wall Street Journal reporter, for
example, reports that in 1996 "companies incorporated in Delaware
were worth 5% more than companies incorporated elsewhere," but
fails to note that the coefficient used to make this estimation is only
significant at 90% confidence.7 ° Still, the argument presented in this
Article does not depend on challenging the Daines result. The theo-
retical response to Daines offered by Bar-Gill, Barzuza, and Bebchuk is
65 Id.
See Oren Bar-Gill, Michal Barzuza, & Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Market for Cor-
porate Law (July 2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
67 Id. at 26. The model provides a formalization of certain features of corporate
charter competition noted in a qualitative way by Klausner. See Klausner, supra note
15, at 774-89 (describing these features in the context of network externalities).
68 See Guhan Subramanian, The Disappearing Delaware Effect (June 2002) (un-
published manuscript, on file with author).
69 Daines, supra note 14, at 535 tbl.3; see also PAUL A. GOMPERS, JOY L. ISHII, &
ANDREW METRICK, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND EQurTY PRICEs 28 tbl.10 (Nat'l Bu-
reau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8449, 2001) (finding a negative correla-
tion between Tobin's Q and Delaware incorporation, after controlling for their "gov-
ernance index," but acknowledging that the difference from Daines's result "may be
due to differences in the samples, time periods, or control variables").
70 Steven Lipin, Deals & Deal Makers: Firms Incorporated in Delaware Are Valued More
by Investors, WALL ST. J., Feb. 28, 2000, at C21; see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Ap-
proach, supra note 6 at 137-38 (pointing out theoretical objections to Daines's finding
and offering alternative explanations, but not questioning the basic econometric re-
sult); Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: A Reply to Professor Gilson
26 (NYU Ctr. for Law & Bus., Working Paper No. CLB-01-006, 2001) (using Daines's
result to respond to Gilson's critique of Delaware law), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract id=268
5 2 0; Bebchuk, Cohen, &
Ferrell, supra note 6 (manuscript at 8-13) (same).
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sufficient to reconcile the findings reported here with Daines.7'
D. Assessment
While commentators continue to disagree about the nature of
competition in the corporate charter marketplace, both sides agree-
and agree that they agree-on three important assumptions that
frame this debate. 2 First, both sides assume that states seek to maxi-
mize the number of companies incorporated within their bounda-
ries. Second, both sides agree that the objective is shareholder
wealth maximization. Third, both sides agree that managers will
pursue their own self-interest.75 The crux of the debate, then, is the
degree of alignment between managers' self-interest and sharehold-
ers' interests.
Race-to-the-top advocates point to the general migration of com-
panies to Delaware over the past twenty years as evidence in support of
their view. Delaware's comprehensive case law, its specialized Court of
Chancery, its experienced and respected corporate lawjudges, and its
responsiveness to corporate law innovations in other states all provide
benefits to corporations. Managers are driven to Delaware in order to
reap these benefits and to increase shareholder value.7" Romano of-
71 Bar-Gill, Barzuza, & Bebchuk, supra note 66; see also infra note 92 (identifying a
potential "mix effect" explanation for Daines's result).
72 E.g., Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1451; Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 228.
73 See Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 228 ("[T]he objective of states is reve-
nue maximization, which is thought to depend directly upon the volume of domestic
incorporations."); see also Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1451-55 (pointing out objections to
this assumption but concluding that "for the purpose of analyzing the effects of state
competition, the appropriate assumption remains that state law is shaped by states' de-
sire to attract incorporations").
74 See, e.g., Winter, supra note 1, at 256 ("States seeking corporate charters will thus
try to provide legal systems which optimize the shareholder-corporation relation-
ship.").
75 E.g., Cary, supra note 5, at 699; Winter, supra note 1, at 257.
76 ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 9; see also Fisch, supra note 16, at 1064 (at-
tributing Delaware's success in the corporate charter market to "the unique lawmaking
function of the Delaware courts"); Kahan & Kamar, Price Discrimination, supra note 28,
at 1212-14 (discussing the sources of Delaware's market power); Kaouris, supra note 13,
at 1004 (explaining Delaware's preeminence by noting that it "has a responsive legisla-
ture, a flexible statute, specialized courts, a wealth of precedents, an efficient Secretary
of State's Office, and efficient corporation service companies"); Touchstone Software
Corp. Proxy Statement, supra note 27 (identifying "well established principles of cor-
porate governance," "prominence, predictability, and flexibility of Delaware law," and
"increased ability to attract and retain qualified directors" as the board's principal rea-
sons for recommending reincorporation from California to Delaware).
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fers one particular version of this theory, arguing that because Dela-
ware depends so heavily on corporate charter revenues, Delaware can
effectively pre-commit to rapid adoption of corporate law innovations
from other states."
Race-to-the-bottom advocates, in turn, point to the proliferation of
second-generation antitakeover statutes among the states in the late
1980s and early 1990s as evidence in support of their view. Such is the
strength of the econometric evidence that virtually all commentators
agree that these antitakeover statutes reduce shareholder value."' The
mere existence of these statutes raises problems for the race-to-the-top
view, because, in theory, states should compete with each other to re-
move such statutes, not to put them in place. 79 Winter's original ex-
planation on jurisdictional grounds"° is no longer valid after the Su-
preme Court's 1982 decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp."' Easterbrook
77 See Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 24041 ("The dependence on franchise
tax revenues is forward-looking, warranting that Delaware will continue to respond to
corporate needs .... ").
78 See, e.g., Bratton & McCahery, supra note 53, at 1881 n.65 ("A large body of em-
pirical work confirms that the antitakeover statutes had a harmful effect on share-
holder value."); Fisch, supra note 16, at 1062 ("[S] tudies indicate that state antitake-
over statutes reduce shareholder value."); Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 856
("Empirical research on the wealth effects of takeover laws, is... most consistent with
Cary's view of the harmful effect of state competition"); see also Amanda Acquisition
Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J.) ("If
our views of the wisdom of state law mattered, Wisconsin's takeover statute would not
survive.... [W]e believe that antitakeover legislation injures shareholders." (footnote
omitted)).
79 See Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1446 ("[T]he adoption of antitakeover measures
by many states presents a puzzle for race for the top adherents, who generally believe
that impediments to takeovers are inefficient."); Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 846
("The persistent and rapid proliferation of takeover statutes across the states thereafter
presented an apparently thorny question for advocates of federalism.").
80 SeeWinter, supra note 1, at 288 ("Because [antitakeover statutes] have an extra-
territorial effect, e.g., they apply even when all shareholders reside elsewhere or are
scattered among the states, the competition for charters is not the significant factor in
the state legislative judgment.").
81 457 U.S. 624 (1982). Five years after Winter's remarks, in MITE, the Supreme
Court struck down Illinois' first-generation takeover law (which prohibited acquisitions
of any firm with substantial assets in Illinois unless an Illinois public official approved)
on the grounds that it unduly burdened interstate commerce. MITE, 457 U.S. at 643-
46; see also Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1469 n.116 ("The development of state antitake-
over laws since the publication of Winter's article therefore undercuts his attempt to
square the prevalence of state antitakeover laws with the race for the top logic." (cita-
tion omitted)). Mark Roe argues that Winter did not intend for his race-to-the-top
theory to apply to state antitakeover statutes, even before MITE. See MarkJ. Roe, Take-
over Politics, in THE DEAL DECADE: WHAT TAKEOvERS AND LEVERAGED BUYOUTS MEAN
FOR CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 321, 348 (Margaret M. Blair ed., 1993) ("Winter did not
1812 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1795
acknowledges that the evidence is inconsistent with his argument, but
nevertheless predicts that the race-to-the-top view will hold in the long
,,82run, even if "the long run takes time to arrive. Of course, this pre-
diction is untestable s3 We know that in our fifteen years of experi-
ence with second-generation antitakeover statutes, not a single state
has ratcheted down its antitakeover protections. 84
The primary reason that neither side has been able to deliver a
"knock-out blow" in the race debate is that empirical studies have
failed to focus on the critical question, in fact the only question that
divides race-to-the-bottom and race-to-the-top proponents: Are man-
agers able to pursue private benefits of control to the detriment of
shareholders, or do market forces align managers' interests with
shareholders' interests? Prior empirical studies have focused either
on the actions of states85 or the reaction of equity markets, s6 which are
responses to (and indirect effects of) the actions of managers in the
model that both sides have adopted. In Part III, I attempt to answer
the critical question more squarely by constructing an empirical test
argue that law would always appear to favor shareholders .... Nor did he argue that
analyses of state competition applied to antitakeover law."). The argument presented
here does not depend on characterizing the proliferation of antitakeover statutes as a
race to the bottom. Instead, it takes the proliferation of the antitakeover statutes as
exogenous and examines companies' responses to them.
2 Amanda Acquisition, 877 F.2d at 507; see also Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach,
supra note 6, at 131-32 (stating that race-to-the-top proponents reconcile their beliefs
with the emergence of antitakeover statutes "by characterizing state takeover law as a
fluke, an aberration, an imperfection in the competitive process").
83The argument also evokes Keynes's famous rejoinder. See JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, A TRACT ON MONETARY REFORM 80 (1924) ("But this long run is a misleading
guide to current affairs. In the long run we are all dead. Economists set themselves too
easy, too useless a task if in tempestuous seasons they can only tell us that when the
storm is long past the ocean is flat again.").
84 The closest example to a ratcheting down occurred in Minnesota, which
adopted a fair price statute in 1987 and repealed it in February 1988, only to enact it
again (with very similar terms) in August 1991. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.675 (West
Supp. 2002 & Historical & Statutory Notes).
See, e.g., Loewenstein, supra note 12, at 501 ("The twenty-five years that have
passed since the appearance of Cary's article have not borne out his dire predictions of
the progress of Delaware law. That law has not moved inexorably in favor of managers,
and to the detriment of the interests of shareholders.").
86 See, e.g., Daines, supra note 14, at 529 (testing whether firm value is affected by
investors paying more or less for assets governed by Delaware law); Dodd & Leftwich,
supra note 55, at 261 ("The ... premise is that investors weigh the costs and benefits of
alternative state corporation codes when they consider investments in securities of
firms incorporated in particular states."). To be fair, Daines does not claim to be offer-
ing direct evidence on the race debate, though he does conclude that "Delaware does
not lead in a national 'race to the bottom' in the production of corporate law." Id. at
528 (footnote omitted).
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that focuses on the actions of managers. Before doing so, Part II pre-
sents basic statistics on the 1990s corporate charter marketplace.
II. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Basic statistics on the 1990s market for corporate charters are sur-
prisingly lacking. This Part attempts to fill this gap."' The sample in-
cludes all exchange-traded companies in Compustat's database of in-
dustrial firms that have both headquarters and incorporation data and
positive sales for 2000. It excludes all foreign companies that are in
this database, including those with issued and outstanding American
Depository Receipts (ADRs).
A. Corporate Charter Stock in 200088
1. Corporate Headquarters vs. State of Incorporation
As a starting point, Figure 1 shows the breakdown of corporate
headquarters, defined by Compustat as the company's "primary loca-
tion," in 2000. It shows that corporate headquarters are spread rela-
tively evenly across the United States, with companies roughly propor-
tional to population. California, New York, and Texas are home to
the most companies; collectively they represent a 35% share by num-
ber and a 37% share by sales. Eight states are home to another one-
third of companies, and thirty-nine states, each with no more than a
2% share, are home to the final one-third of companies.
Figure 2 shows that the breakdown by state of incorporation is
considerably more concentrated. It quantifies the well-known fact
that Delaware holds a dominant share in the market for corporate
charters-50% by number of companies, 89 and 59% by sales in 2000.
The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), a test of market concentra-
tion used frequently in the antitrust arena to evaluate horizontal
mergers, is 2,662 for the corporate charter industry in 2000-well
above the 1800 threshold in the DOJ/FTC Horizontal Merger Guidelines
87 Contemporaneous work by Lucian Bebchuk and Alma Cohen also addresses
this deficiency with respect to the corporate charter stock in 1999. Bebchuk & Cohen,
supra note 6.
88 These analyses were prompted by earlier joint work with John Coates, docu-
menting a California headquarters effect, see infta note 92 (discussing a potential "mix
effect" explanation for Daines's Delaware result), as well as invaluable conversations
with Lucian Bebchuk.
89 See also Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at A-2 tbl.2 (finding a 51% market
share for Delaware in 1999).
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for characterization as a "highly concentrated" industry.90 In Part II.B,
I explore further to show that Delaware began from a position of con-
siderable strength in the late 1980s and then continued to grow its
share through reincorporations and IPO companies in the 1990s,
though there are some signs that Delaware's share reached a plateau
by the end of the decade.
Figure 2 shows that Maryland holds the second largest share
among U.S. public companies in 2000, though almost all of this share
is attributable to real estate investment trusts (REITs). 9' California
holds the next-largest share of the corporate charter market, at 4%,
though this is substantially less than its 16% share of corporate head-
92quarters. I return to this fact in a more rigorous way in the large
sample analysis that I present in Part III.
Figure 3 focuses on out-of-state incorporations to states other than
Delaware. The left bar chart shows that 15% of companies are incor-
porated neither in their home state nor in Delaware: This statistic is
somewhat at odds with the conventional view in prior scholarship that
managers consider the charter decision to be between their headquar-
ters state and Delaware.94 In fact, some states have made successful in-
roads against Delaware. The right pie chart shows that three states-
Maryland, Nevada, and Massachusetts-control more than half of the
90 DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES
(1992 & 1997), repinted in PHILLIP AREEDA & Louis KAPLOW, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 855
(5th ed. 1997). This finding is consistent with Bebchuk and Cohen's analysis. See
Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 31-32 (calculating an HHI of 2,747 for the corpo-
rate charter market overall and a 3,552 HHI among Fortune 500 companies).
91 Maryland has 56% share among REITs (103 out of 184 REITs in the data set).
When REITs and other financial companies are excluded, Maryland's share drops to
0.7% of the corporate charter market. I exclude REITs and other financial companies
from the regression data set used in Part III. Infra text accompanying note 139.
92 This finding highlights a potential "mix effect" explanation for Daines's Dela-
ware result. In fact, California represents 22% of the companies incorporated in
Delaware and only 11% of companies incorporated in all other states. In Part III.F.1, I
offer an explanation for why California firms are more likely to migrate to Delaware
than firms headquartered in other states. With respect to the Daines result, this find-
ing suggests that the higher Qs reported for Delaware companies may reflect, at least
in part, a mix effect rather than the benefits of Delaware incorporation. Subramanian,
supra note 68.
93 This finding is consistent with Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 3, reporting
that 14% of the companies in their sample are incorporated in neither their home
state nor Delaware.
Q4 See, e.g., Fisch, supra note 16, at 1062 ("Corporations choose between incorpo-
rating in their home state and incorporating in Delaware. Virtually no corporation
chooses any other alternative."); Daines, supra note 14, at 547 tbl.8 ("[S]ample firms
incorporate either in Delaware or their home state ....").
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out-of-state incorporation market outside of Delaware.9
Figure 3 masks considerable variation by state. Figure 4 breaks
down the incorporation decision by headquarters state among eleven
major headquarters states:
Figure 4: Incorporation Choice by Headquarters State
















Figure 4 shows a wide range among home-state incorporation
rates, from Illinois (8%) to Minnesota (72%)." Among the major
states, California, New York, and Texas have relatively low in-state in-
corporation rates (as previously noted), while Massachusetts, Pennsyl-
97vania, and Florida are slightly above average.
95 As noted previously, Maryland's share comprises mostly REITs. Supra note 91.
Moreover, Massachusetts' share is primarily mutual funds. Kahan & Kamar, Myth, su-
pra note 28, at 102. If REITs, mutual funds, and other financial companies are ex-
cluded, I find that the percentage of companies incorporated in neither their home
state nor in Delaware decreases to 10%, still higher than what other commentators
have suggested. Financial companies are excluded from the analysis presented in infra
Part III.
96 Minnesota's high in-state incorporation rate is echoed in nearby northern mid-
western states: Montana (75%), Oregon (73%), Wisconsin (72%), and Indiana (72%).
An analysis of companies in these states suggests no distinguishable characteristics in
terms of financial performance, size, or industry mix between companies in these
states and companies in other states. The cause for this difference therefore remains a
puzzle.
97 Of course, the state with the highest in-state incorporation rate is Delaware, at
90%.
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2. Nondefault Incorporation Choices
Finally, if Delaware and home-state incorporation can, in some
sense be considered default choices, Figure 5 focuses on the nonde-
fault choices that companies have made:
Figure 5: Win/Lose by Headquarters State
Number of Cornpanies
-0 20 -100 0 10 20 0 40
and te nuber f copanis "lst" ornther stoSates teuigr ea
war on bohsie. h log i~ ic is that losing : !I  aninstt company to:
Delwaeoenon aip ta eare n of t
in-stat corporte codeby in-satema aed r wh ner aes snni-tt
pany represe~Pnts vanafiratiecoc ytemngr fta
Ohi
Figure 5 shows the numbe  of companies "won" from other states,
and the number of companies "lost" to other states, excluding Dela-
ware on both sides. The logic is that losing an in-state company to
Delaware does not necessarily represent a perceived inadequacy of the
in-state corporate code by in-state managers, whereas losing an in-state
company to some other state (Nevada, for example) does signal dissat-
isfaction with the in-state regime relative to the third state. Con-
versely, for any state other than Delaware to win an out-of-state com-
pany represents an affirmative choice by the managers of that
company for the particular rules being offered by the winning state.
Figure 5 thus focuses on these affirmative choices in both directions.
As in Figure 4, Figure 5 reveals wide variation among states.
These variations can be grouped into three categories. At one end of
the spectrum, California, New York, Texas, and Illinois are the big
losers: among them they have attracted 126 companies from other
states and lost 558 companies to other states, representing a net loss of
432 companies. (The magnitude of this net loss is all the more strik-
ing because it excludes migrations to and from Delaware.) On the
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other end of the spectrum, Maryland, Nevada, and Minnesota are the
big winners: among them they have attracted 575 companies from
other states and lost only twenty-nine companies to them, represent-
ing a net gain of 546 companies. Finally, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and
Massachusetts are in the middle, gaining and losing roughly the same
number of companies. 98 In Parts III and IV, I develop a model of the
corporate incorporation decision that attempts to explain all three of
these classifications.
B. Corporate Charter Flows in the 1990s
1. Reincorporations
Part II.A examined the stock of incorporations as it existed in
2000. I now turn to an examination of the flow of reincorporations
during the 1990s. While prior commentators have identified the gen-
eral migration to Delaware, they have largely failed to identify where
these companies are coming from.99 Table 1 shows the original state
of incorporation and destination state of incorporation for 373 mid-
stream reincorporations °° over the period 1991-2001.'°1
Table 1 shows that Delaware received 208 out of 373 reincorporat-
ing firms, or a 56% market share among reincorporations. This figure
reflects a substantial drop compared to studies of earlier eras, which
generally found an 80% to 90% reincorporation rate to Delaware0
98 Bebchuk and Cohen present data for all 50 states. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra
note 6, at A-5 tbl.5A.
Cf Daines, supra note 14, at 529 ("[T]he [reincorporation] studies generally do
not distinguish between firms leaving Delaware and firms entering Delaware, but in-
stead study all reincorporating firms.").
100 Though Compustat states that its database captures only public companies,
COMPUSTAT (NORTH AMERICA) USER'S GUIDE 1 (2000), available at
http://www.gsb.columbia.edu/cis/research/database/compustat/COMPman.htm,
Compustat sometimes includes company data, including state of incorporation, from
registration documents filed in conjunction with the IPO, id. at 131. Out of 624 rein-
corporations in my data set, 251 were excluded as IPO-stage reincorporations. The
findings presented in this Part (including the California-to-Delaware migration) con-
tinue to hold if IPO-stage reincorporations are also included in the analysis.
101 Under my definition, a midstream reincorporation occurs when a firm keeps its
name but changes its state of incorporation. Reincorporations that are the result of
mergers are therefore excluded. The only mergers that would be captured under my
definition would be those in which the acquirer merged into the target (for tax or ac-
counting reasons), and thus adopted the target's state of incorporation, but the
merged entity kept only the acquirer's name. I know of no such instances myself and
believe them to be extremely rare, if not nonexistent.
102 See Dodd & Leftwich, supra note 55, at 263 (finding that 90% of a sample of 140






NYSE company reincorporations between 1927 and 1977 were to Delaware); Kaouris,
supra note 13, at 1012 tbl.2, 1013 tbl.3 (finding that 89% of 255 OTC and 81% of 150
NYSE reincorporations between 1982 and 1994 were to Delaware); Romano, Some
Pieces, supra note 4, at 244 (finding that 82% of all reincorporating companies between
1960 and 1982 were to Delaware). My result is consistent with recent unreported work
by Rob Daines: as part of his Q estimate for Delaware and non-Delaware firms, he
finds approximately a 65% reincorporation rate to Delaware. Telephone Interview
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The decline in the 1990s might reflect a slight weakening of Dela-
ware's dominance of the corporate charter market. Note, however,
that Delaware's market share among reincorporations is still slightly
higher than Delaware's share of newly incorporated companies (56%
versus 50%, from Figure 2), indicating that Delaware is still gaining
ground, albeit at a much slower pace, in the market for corporate
charters.
Table 1 also shows that 84 reincorporations were from California
to Delaware, representing 23% of total reincorporations and 40% of
reincorporations to Delaware. 0 3 In contrast, only 5 reincorporations
in the sample are from Delaware to California. The California-to-
Delaware migration is interesting not only because California has the
largest share of headquartered companies, °4 but also because Califor-
nia has no antitakeover laws and "has long been known for its share-
holder rights stance and its unwillingness to bend to corporate inter-
ests. "  I return to this comparison in Part III.F.1.
Figure 6 provides additional detail on the reincorporations re-
ported in Table 1 by classifying reincorporating companies according
to their headquarters state. Not surprisingly, Figure 6 shows that the
biggest flows in the 1990s were from headquarters states to Delaware
(151 reincorporations) and from Delaware back to headquarters
states (93 reincorporations). These two flows account for approxi-
mately two-thirds of total reincorporations in the 1990s, indicating
that one-third of reincorporations were between states other than
Delaware and the company's headquarters state. This finding con-
firms the result presented in Part II.A, that the corporate charter mar-
ket is more dynamic than the headquarters-versus-Delaware analysis
106that prior commentators have suggested.
Figure 6 also sheds additional light on the California-to-Delaware
migration. While Table 1 shows that 40% of total reincorporations to
Delaware were from California companies, Figure 6 shows that half
(76 out of 151) of all reincorporations from headquarters state to
103 Among companies tracked by IRRC (n = 2,421), I find an even larger Califor-
nia-to-Delaware migration: 37% of total reincorporations in the sample (96 out of
259) and 51% of reincorporations to Delaware (96 out of 190) are from California to
Delaware. IRRC tracks the S&P 1500 and other companies "selected primarily on the
basis of market capitalization and high institutional ownership levels." VIRGINIA
ROSENBAUM, CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES, at ix (1998).
104 Supra Figure 1.
105 MARIA CARMEN S. PINNELL, STATE TAKEOVER LAws, at California-i (2000).
106 Supra Figure 3 and accompanying text.
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Delaware were from companies headquartered in California. Again,
this statistic indicates the magnitude of the California-to-Delaware flow
and suggests that the oft-cited migration to Delaware can in large part
be characterized as a migration away from California.
Table 2 provides reincorporation data for the thirty-six states that
were home to reincorporating companies during the 1990s:
Table 2: 1990s Reincorporations by Headquarters State
Headquarters DE-HQ DE4OTH HQ4DEHQ4OTH OTH4DEOTH4HQOTH4OTH Tota
labama -3 1 1 A
frotal 1 93 25 151 11 57 30 ( 37
2. IPOs
Figure 6 and Table 2 capture only midstream reincorporations
among public companies. I exclude from my analysis reincorporation
decisions that occur at the IPO stage because IPO reincorporations
are fundamentally different from midstream reincorporations. Rein-
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agency problems as midstream reincorporations; moreover, any deci-
sions that adversely affect shareholder value should, in theory, get
priced in the IPO.' °7 Still, it is worthwhile to report evidence from in-
corporation choice at the IPO stage to determine whether Delaware is
gaining or losing ground at the beginning of the pipeline. Here we
find that Delaware is continuing to gain market share: examining 310
IPOs from 1994 to 1997, Daimes and Klausner report a 68% Delaware
incorporation rate;'0 8 Coates similarly reports a 62% Delaware incor-
poration rate among 162 companies that went public in 1991 and
1992;'09 and Field and Karpoff report a 59% Delaware incorporation
rate among their sample of IPO companies. " Delaware, therefore,
seems to be well represented at the beginning of the pipeline in addi-
tion to its dominance of the corporate charter market among mature
public companies.
C. Assessment
To summarize, in the 1990s Delaware sustained a dominant share
of the existing corporate charter market (50%), the reincorporation
market (56%), and the IPO charter market (approximately 60%).
Delaware's dominance is well known and has led many commentators
to draw two conclusions: first, that the incorporation choice for pub-
lic company managers is largely between the company's headquarters
state and Delaware; and second, for reasons described in Part I, that
the migration to Delaware generally represents a race to the top."'
However, two additional findings from this Part, previously unre-
ported in the corporate charter literature, cast doubt on both of these
conclusions.
107 But see John C. Coates IV, Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the
Lawyers, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1301, 1385 (2001) (suggesting that defenses may be mispriced
at the IPO stage).
108 Robert Daines & Michael Klausner, Do IPO Charters Maximize Firm Value? Anti-
takeover Protection in IPOs, 17J.L. ECON. & ORG. 83, 96 tbl.2 (2001).
109 Coates, supra note 107, at 1353 tbl.3.
110 Id. at 1358 n.188 (citing Laura Casares Field & Jonathan M. Karpoff, Takeover
Defenses at IPO Firms 37 tbl.3 (Oct. 27, 1999) (unpublished manuscript, on file with
author)).
III See, e.g., Daines, supra note 14, at 539 ("[T]he flow of assets into Delaware is
dramatic .... This could reflect assets moving into a higher-value jurisdiction."). But
see Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, supra note 6 (manuscript at 23) ("Many scholars, with-
out much discussion, have assumed that the presence of benefits to shareholders from
Delaware incorporation would prove that state competition benefits investors. This is
not a valid inference.").
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First, I find that other states have made some inroads against
Delaware and seem to present a viable alternative for managers who
are considering incorporating out of state. In fact, 15% of U.S. public
companies are incorporated in a state other than their home state or
Delaware, higher than prior commentators have either reported or
assumed. In addition, one-third of all reincorporations are between
states other than the headquarters state and Delaware.
Second, the conclusion that the migration to Delaware represents
a race to the top ignores an important fact about where these compa-
nies are coming from. In fact, a large number of the reincorporations
to Delaware are coming from California, a state with no antitakeover
protections. Thus, while race-to-the-top advocates have characterized
Delaware's antitakeover statute as moderate,'1 2 the statute is, in fact,
quite protective relative to the most likely alternative for many Dela-
ware companies." 3 In the next Part, I develop a general model of in-
corporation choice that builds from the California-to-Delaware illus-
tration.
III. A MODEL OF INCORPORATION CHOICE
This Part develops a model of incorporation choice that squarely
tests the empirical question implicit in the race-to-the-top/race-to-the
bottom debate: Are managers able to pursue private benefits of con-
trol to the detriment of shareholders, or do market pressures align
managers' interests with shareholders'? The model of incorporation
choice that I develop here focuses on second-generation antitakeover
statutes. Part III.A describes the approach. Part III.B describes the
sample and model specification. Parts III.C and III.D present the re-
sults from the incorporation model and the reincorporation model,
respectively. Part III.E assesses the evidence. Part III.F presents brief
case studies of California and Nevada, which illustrate the phenomena
that underlie the large-sample results.
:2 E.g., Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 855-56.
13 See, for example, the Touchstone Software proxy statement that recommended
reincorporation from California to Delaware but acknowledged that reincorporation
may be disadvantageous to the extent that it has the effect of discouraging a
future takeover attempt which is not approved by the Board of Directors, but
which a majority of the shareholders may deem to be in their best interest or
in which stockholders may receive a substantial premium for their shares over
the then current market value or over their cost basis in such shares.
Touchstone Software Corp. Proxy Statement, supra note 27.
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A. Methodology
1. The Proliferation of Antitakeover Statutes
After the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the jurisdictional reach of
Indiana's antitakeover statute in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Amer-
ica,'1 "second-generation" antitakeover statutes rapidly proliferated
across a majority of states in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Five types
of statutes are the most common today. First, control share acquisi-
tion statutes prevent a bidder from voting its shares beyond a specified
threshold (typically between 20% and 50%) unless a majority of disin-
terested shareholders vote to allow the bidder to exercise the voting
rights of its control stake. Second, business combination statutes (or
"freeze-out" statutes) prevent a bidder from engaging in a wide range
of transactions with an acquired company (most importantly merger,
liquidation, and sale of assets), typically for either three or five years
after the bidder acquires its controlling stake, unless the target board
approves the acquisition. Third, "fair price" statutes, often combined
with business combination statutes, set procedural criteria to deter-
mine a fair price in takeover contests. Some state statutes eliminate
business combination restrictions if fair price criteria are met, and fair
price criteria in turn often can be avoided if the bidder gains approval
from a supermajority of disinterested shares (typically 80%). Fourth,
many states have "other constituency" statutes (also known as "con-
stituency statutes" or "director duties" statutes), which allow the board
to consider the welfare of nonshareholder constituencies (such as
employees or the local community), either in the particular context of
a takeover contest or more generally. Finally, many states have "pill
validation" statutes, which endorse the use of a poison pill against a
hostile bidder.
Table 3 lists the states that have adopted each of these statutes,
along with the years that they became effective. Table 3 shows that by
2000, 27 states had control share acquisition statutes, 33 had freeze-
out statutes, 27 had fair price statutes, 31 had constituency statutes,
and 25 had pill validation statutes 15 Delaware, notably, has a business
combination statute (with a three-year freeze-out period) but provides
no other antitakeover protections." 6
114 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
115 PINNELL, supra note 105, at app. A at A-1.
116 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (2001).
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Table 3: State Antitakeover Statutes
Business
Control Share Business Combination
Constituency Acquisition Combination Fair Price Pill Validation Statute (# of
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The choice of default rule is important for antitakeover statutes
because opt-in statutes require a shareholder vote in order to become
effective, whereas opt-out statutes are effective unless the board pro-
poses opting out. In fact, the vast majority of the statutes listed in Ta-
ble 3 are opt-out statutes; only two statutes (Georgia's fair price statute
and Tennessee's control share acquisition statute) require opting in.I
7
These two opt-in statutes are not particularly important for our analy-
sis; fair price statutes seem to have had little influence on the incorpo-
ration decision,' 8 and Tennessee incorporations account for only
0.6% of observations in the data set.119 We also know that few compa-
nies outside of Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts choose to opt
out. °2 0 Therefore, the statutes listed in Table 3 are effective for the
vast majority of companies incorporated in those states.
Table 3 also highlights one of the attractive features of my ap-
proach, namely, the nonuniformity across states. Other commenta-
tors have noted the difficulty of empirical research on the corporate
charter debate because of general uniformity in corporate law. 2 1 In
the context of antitakeover statutes, Table 3 shows twenty-one combi-
nations of antitakeover statutes (out of thirty-two possible permuta-
tions) represented among the states today.
2. The Wealth Effects of Antitakeover Statutes
Many commentators have studied the stock market reaction to an-
titakeover statutes. These studies do not suffer from the same defi-
ciencies as reincorporation event studies 2 because antitakeover stat-
utes typically appear in isolation, without confounding events.
Instead, the primary methodological challenge for antitakeover stat-
17 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1110 to 14-2-1113 (1999); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-103-
301 to 48-103-312 (1995).
118 InftaTable 5, Row 4.
19 Supra Table 1.
20 Infra text accompanying notes 218-25.
121 See, e.g., Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 140 (describing the
"uniform tendency of states to provide considerable protection to incumbents"); Car-
ney, supra note 52, at 717 (stating that American corporate law is "relatively uniform
across most states"); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Future as History: The Prospects for Global
Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications, 93 Nw. U. L. REV. 641, 702
(1999) ("[T]he best documented finding in the empirical literature on the U.S. corpo-
rate chartering competition is that a high degree of uniformity has emerged in Ameri-
can corporate laws."); Romano, supra note 16, at 709 (finding "substantial uniformity
across the states").
12 See supra text accompanying notes 55-59 (discussing various reincorporation
event studies).
1830 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAWREVIEW [Vol. 150:1795
ute event studies is capturing the correct event window. Commenta-
tors have chosen various baseline dates: the first mention in the press,
the introduction of the bill in the state legislature, the date that the
bill was signed into law by the governor, or the effective date for the
law. Most studies use more than one baseline date.
12 3
Romano provides the most comprehensive review of these stud-
ies. 114 She concludes from this analysis that "[e]mpirical research on
the effects of takeover laws on shareholder wealth is most consistent
with Cary's view of the harmful effect of state competition." 125 Indeed,
the weight of the evidence suggests that constituency statutes, business
combination statutes, control share acquisition statutes, and pill vali-
dation statutes yield negative abnormal returns, on average, for af-
fected companies. Fair price studies present an exception from this
general trend: none of the three econometric studies that Romano
116surveys find abnormal returns in either direction.
Subsequent studies confirm these basic findings."7 As a result, vir-
tually all academic commentators on both sides of the race debate
agree that state antitakeover statutes generally reduce shareholder
value. 2 '
123 See, e.g., John C. Alexander et al., Nonshareholder Constituency Statutes and Share-
holder Wealth: A Note, 21 J. BANKING & FIN. 417 (1997) (using introduction of statute
and passage of statute as baseline dates); William N. Pugh & John S. Jahera, Jr., State
Antitakeover Legislation and Shareholder Wealth, 13 J. FIN. RES. 221 (1990) (examining re-
turns around introduction of statute, passage by legislature, and approval by gover-
nor); see also Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-
Generation State Takeover Legislation, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 291, 308-09 tbls.3-4 (1989) (using
first earliest press report as baseline date).
124 See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 62-66 (providing an extensive table on
the studies of takeover statutes).
125 Id. at 60. Importantly, some studies find negative abnormal returns only for
companies that do not have firm-level defenses. See, e.g., Karpoff & Malatesta, supra
note 123, at 321 (suggesting that firm-level defenses may substitute for state antitake-
over statutes). This substitution effect would only serve to weaken the results in Part
III.C. The fact that I nevertheless get statistically significant results indicates the
stren~th of the migration to state antitakeover statutes.
See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 64 (finding "[n]o significant effect" in
any of three fair price studies).
127 See PINNELL, supra note 105, at app. C (reviewing antitakeover statute event
studies through 2000). In fact, most studies of antitakeover statutes occurred in the
early 1990s, coincident with the proliferation of the antitakeover statutes themselves.
See supra Table 3 (showing that most of the statutes became effective in the late 1980s
and early 1990s). Therefore Romano's 1993 survey is more up-to-date than its timing
might suggest.
128 Supra note 78 and accompanying text.
2002] ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES AND INCORPORATION CHOICE 1831
3. Opt-Out from Antitakeover Statutes
Despite this consensus view, opt-out from the typical antitakeover
statutes is rare. Among IPO firms, Daines and Klausner report a 6%
opt-out rate from the Delaware business combination statute for firms
incorporating in Delaware, and a 2% opt-out rate from antitakeover
statutes in other states. 29 My own analysis of 2,421 firms tracked by
the Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) reveals an impor-
tant difference between companies in states with typical antitakeover
statutes and companies in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts. I
find a 2.3% opt-out from Delaware's business combination statute,
and a 3.2% opt-out rate from other states' antitakeover statutes, con-
sistent with the Daines and Klausner findings for IPO companies. I
also find, however, that 37% of firms (78 out of 213) opted out of at
least some parts of the Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Massachusetts anti-
takeover statutes.
This finding suggests that race-to-the-top proponents cannot rea-
sonably rely on opt-out as the mechanism that moves the race to the
top in the corporate charter marketplace with respect to the typical
antitakeover statutes. In fact, most companies do not opt out of these
statutes. There seems to be an important difference in managers' de-
cision making between opt-out in states with more extreme statutes
(which is common) and opt-out in states with more common statutes
(which is rare).
4. Null Hypothesis
Instead of opting out of state antitakeover statutes, companies
might spur a race to the top through their movements over time. The
argument is that companies that remain in heavily protected states
should suffer from the negative wealth effects of antitakeover statutes.
Managers of these companies will be pressured to migrate out of these
states, either by the takeover market, the capital market, the product
market, or some combination of these disciplining devices. The race-
to-the-top view predicts that, as a result, managers will migrate away
from antitakeover statutes.
The race-to-the-bottom view offers the opposite prediction. Be-
cause state antitakeover statutes "directly affect the strength of market
discipline," 130 the disciplining devices on which race-to-the-top propo-
129 Daines & Klausner, supra note 108, at 96 tbl.2.
130 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1468.
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nents rely will not properly influence managers' behavior. Instead,
managers can pursue private benefits to the detriment of sharehold-
ers, and will migrate to antitakeover statutes rather than away from
them.
These competing predictions suggest a relatively clean empirical
test. The null hypothesis is that state antitakeover statutes have no
impact on managers' incorporation decisions. If, instead, managers
are repelled from state antitakeover statutes, this finding would sup-
port the race-to-the-top view. If managers are attracted to antitake-
over statutes, this result would support the race-to-the-bottom view.1
31
The following Section specifies the model and describes the sam-
ple in more detail.
B. Model Specification
The basic model predicts firms' current state of incorporation-
classified as either headquarters state, Delaware, or a third state-
using the antitakeover statutes of the headquarters state and other
firm characteristics thought to influence the incorporation decision as
independent variables. It may seem counterintuitive to determine
whether firms are migrating to or away from antitakeover statutes by
looking at the stock of incorporations rather than the flow of reincor-
porations. Note, however, that "every public company makes an ex-
plicit or implicit reincorporation decision" each year."' Examining
only the flow of reincorporations would focus on the explicit reincor-
poration decisions and miss the far greater number of implicit incor-
poration decisions that are made each year. Thus, the baseline model
131 Of course, this approach relies heavily on the empirical evidence demonstrat-
ing that antitakeover statutes reduce shareholder value. It might be argued that con-
trol share acquisition statutes are, in fact, value improving because they respond to the
"pressure to tender" problem identified by Bebchuk. Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Toward
Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARv. L. REv. 1695,
1696 (1985); Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed
Remedy, 12 DEL.J. CoRp. L. 911, 911 (1987). There are two responses to this objection,
one theoretical and the other empirical. First, even if control share acquisition statutes
were an effective response to the pressure to tender problem, they are overly broad
because they also apply to non-coercive bids. Second, as an empirical matter, the
negative announcement effects summarized here are found with respect to all anti-
takeover statutes, including control share acquisition statutes. (This result may simply
be a manifestation of the first point, that control share acquisition statutes are not nar-
rowly targeted to address the pressure-to-tender problem.) The econometric finding
on antitakeover statutes seems sufficiently robust to be able to pursue the approach
outlined in the text.
132 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1459.
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examines the stock of incorporations as it exists in 2000. In Part III.D,
I also examine the flow of reincorporations to ensure that the results
are robust to this specification.
This model design minimizes a potential bias against finding a
race to the bottom. Recall that shareholders must approve reincorpo-
rations, but do not need to approve remaining in the same state and
cannot initiate a reincorporation themselves.' If managers' interests
are aligned with those of shareholders, as race-to-the-top theorists ar-
gue, then the shareholder vote requirement will not be a binding con-
straint (because shareholders will approve all reincorporation propos-
als on which they get to vote), and shareholder inability to initiate
reincorporations will not be a problem (because managers will bring
reincorporation proposals whenever shareholders would have). Thus,
the background corporate law does not present an obstacle to manag-
ers migrating away from antitakeover statutes. If, on the other hand,
managers' interests are not aligned with shareholders', as race-to-the-
bottom theorists argue, then the shareholder vote requirement be-
comes a binding constraint: either shareholders will reject some rein-
corporation proposals that managers bring, or (more likely) managers
will not bring some reincorporation proposals that give them private
benefits but are not in shareholders' interest. Thus, the background
corporate law slows managers in their race to antitakeover statutes,
which creates a bias against finding a race-to-the-bottom result.
3 4
My specification represents a departure from prior methodolo-
gies, which focus on reincorporation flows rather than incorporation
stocks. 3 5 In her 1985 survey of reincorporating firms, for example,
Romano finds that only 16% of reincorporations between 1961 and
1983 were undertaken for antitakeover reasons.3 6 Putting aside the
response bias problem that might undercount reincorporations un-
133 See supra text accompanying note 26-27 (discussing the procedural constraints
on reincorporations).
134 It might be argued that this structural bias guarantees against finding a race to
the bottom-why would shareholders ever approve a move to a value-decreasing state?
Bebchuk offers three reasons: the move may increase shareholder value overall;
shareholders may be imperfectly informed; and the move may be tied to another
measure. Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1471-75. The second reason that Bebchuk offers is
in tension with his proposal for shareholder choice on the reincorporation decision.
Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 152-53.
135 See, e.g., supra notes 55-56 (citing sources). In contrast to these prior studies,
Bebchuk & Cohen use a similar methodology to mine. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra
note 6, at 2 ("[W]hereas prior work has taken incorporation decisions as given, we seek
to investigate the determinants of these incorporation decisions.").
136 Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 252 tbl.4, 256 tbl.6.
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dertaken for antitakeover reasons, this approach fails to consider the
far more frequent decisions that were taken by managers to remain in
states that have antitakeover statutes. 137 Put another way, focusing on
reincorporations fully captures all pro-shareholder reincorporations
but will entirely miss all pro-management non-reincorporations. 13In
contrast, the specification that I have chosen will capture both sides of
the reincorporation decision.
1. Dependent Variable
As in Part III, the sample includes all exchange-traded companies
in Compustat's database of industrial firms that have their headquar-
ters and state of incorporation in the United States. Following Daines,
regulated utilities, insurance companies, banks, REITs, and other fi-
nancial companies are excluded because "the corporate governance,,• 139
of such firms differs due to significant federal regulation.
The dependent variable INCORP is set to 0 if the firm incorpo-
rates in its home state (approximately 38% of observations); 1 if the
firm incorporates in Delaware (52% of observations); and 2 if the firm
incorporates in some other state (10% of observations). As noted
above, this specification captures both sides of the incorporation deci-
sion that managers face: not only the affirmative choices to reincor-
porate, but also the passive decisions that managers make to stay in
their current state.
2. Independent Variables
I use six dummy variables to model the antitakeover characteris-
tics of the headquarters state. Among the typical statutes,
CONSTITUENCY is set to 1 if the headquarters state has a constitu-
ency statute; CONTROL is set to 1 if the headquarters state has a con-
trol share acquisition statute; BUSCOMB is set to 1 if the headquarters
state has a business combination statute; FAIR is set to 1 if the head-
137 Cf Daines, supra note 14, at 527 ("The [reincorporation] studies... do not tell
us about the effect of Delaware law on the vast majority of firms that never reincorpo-
rate after going public.").
138 Bebchuk, Cohen, & Ferrell, supra note 6 (manuscript at 24).
139 Daines, supra note 14, at 530. This exclusion accounts for the difference be-
tween the number of companies analyzed in Part II (n = 7,820) and the number of
companies analyzed in this Part (n = 5,852). See also HOWELL E. JACKSON & EDWARD L.
SYMONS, JR., REGULATION OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 51-53 (1999) (describing the
dual-chartering system in which banks can incorporate under either state or federal
law).
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quarters state has a fair price statute; and PILL is set to 1 if the head-
quarters state has a pill validation statute.
40
I also' include a dummy variable DISGORGESB, set to 1 if the firm
has a disgorgement statute or a staggered board statute, the two types
of particularly potent antitakeover statutes that cannot be adequately
modeled by the other antitakeover variables in the model.14 Equiva-
lently, DISGORGESB is set to 1 for companies headquartered in Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, or Pennsylvania: in 1990, Ohio and Pennsylvania
adopted disgorgement statutes, and Massachusetts adopted a stag-




I include additional independent variables to control for other
140 An alternative approach would be to compress all of the antitakeover attributes
of a state into a single scalar variable. John Coates has taken this approach in develop-
ing his "Contestability Index (CI)," defined as the minimum number of days that it
would take for a hostile bidder to gain control of the target's board. Coates, supra note
107, at 1388 app. B at 1389-90. Calculation of the CI often turns on the ability to act by
written consent or through special meeting, combined with the ability to remove direc-
tors without cause. These features can be set by the firm in its charter or bylaws, and
frequently are. As a result, examining the default terms provided by states on these
issues can lead to counterintuitive results: for example, California and Massachusetts
have the same CI, id. at 1409-50, even though these two states are at opposite ends of
the spectrum in terms of the antitakeover protections provided, infra Parts III.F.1 &
IV.A.2. Because the Cl is more appropriately calculated at the firm level than at the
state level, it is less useful for the state-level analysis that I undertake here. Cf Coates,
supra note 107, at 1409 ("Variations remain remarkably minor [among state default
laws]: indices range only from forty-five to ninety, nowhere near the range found in
any random sample of public companies.").
141 Even though the substantive protections provided by disgorgement statutes and
staggered board statutes are different, I combine them for purposes of this analysis be-
cause I argue in Part IV that they are viewed similarly by institutional investors, and col-
lectively they are distinct from the typical antitakeover statutes. Infra Part IV.B; see also
Daines, supra note 14, at 548 tbl.9 (aggregating Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania
firms for purposes of analysis). In addition, distinguishing the Massachusetts staggered
board statute might capture a "Massachusetts effect" in the incorporation decision,
when I am more interested in a "severe antitakeover statute effect." However, I also
report results from Bebchuk & Cohen, who disaggregate these statutes. Infra note 156
and accompanying text.
142 In June 1999, Maryland adopted a severe antitakeover statute. See Robert B.
Robbins & Dava R. Casoni, Maryland's 'Just Say No" Law, INSIGHTS, Sept. 1999, at 27,
27. I consider Maryland as a separate case, infra Part V.A, because companies may have
had insufficient time to react to the Maryland statute by December 2000, the cut-off
point for the data (collected in June 2001). Note also that Maryland's staggered board
statute is an opt-in statute, compared to Massachusetts' opt-out statute, which may cre-
ate important differences between the two in practice.
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factors often thought to influence the incorporation decision.
LSALE, equal to the natural log of net sales in the year 2000, is in-
cluded, on the view that larger corporations are more likely to have
major law firms as outside counsel, which in turn are more likely to be
based in New York City, which in turn are more likely to recommend
incorporation in Delaware. 43 I include VLARGE, defined as net sales
greater than $20 billion, as a dummy variable, to test the hypothesis
that very large corporations may remain in their home state because
they have greater influence in their home state legislature than they
would have in the Delaware legislature.
144
I also include industry dummy variables at the two-digit SIC code
level. Although some commentators have argued that Delaware caters
to a particular type and size of company,14 to my knowledge no one
has argued that the demand side of the corporate charter market dif-
fers meaningfully by industry. 46 Nevertheless, I include industry
dummies to control for the possibility that there are differences in in-
corporation choice by industry.
C. Results
1. Single-Statute Models
The model is run as a multinomial logistic regression. Before
143 Cf Romano, Some Pieces, supra note 4, at 274 tbl.13 (finding that 52.5% of re-
sponding firms that reincorporated report that outside counsel suggested reincorpo-
rating, indicating that outside counsel are an important source of guidance on the in-
corporation decision). Ideally, the model would include dummy variables for major
law firms, but unfortunately no source I know of reports outside counsel for large
samples of firms. In theory, outside counsel should be aligned with management (and
thus subject to the same potential agency problems) because outside counsel of an ac-
quired firm often does not stay on post-integration. See Coates, supra note 107, at 1334-
35 tbl.1 (constructing a database including law firm identity for 180 IPO firms).
144 See 1 ARTHUR FLEISCHER, JR. & ALEXANDER R. SUSSMAN, TAKEOVER DEFENSE 4-
67 (6th ed. 2000) ("An influential target company may enjoy local political clout and
judicial sympathy aiding its defense.").
145 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER & KENNETH E. SCOTT, ECONOMICS OF
CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION 111 (1980) (arguing that Delaware
specializes in providing corporate laws for large public corporations); Barry D.
Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm, 28 J.L. &
ECON. 179, 185-88 (1985) (arguing that a more diffuse shareholder base leads to in-
corporation in pro-management states such as Delaware).
46 The one exception is the REIT charter market, which is dominated by Mary-
land. Supra note 91 and accompanying text. However, REITs and all other financial
firms are excluded from the regression data set used here. Supra text accompanying
note 139.
20021 ANTITAKEOVER STATUTES AND INCORPORATION CHOICE 1837
running the full model, I run a parsimonious model with each of the
antitakeover statutes individually, in order to avoid potential multi-
collinearity problems arising from the fact that many states have
adopted more than one of the five typical antitakeover statutes. Re-
sults from these single-statute models are reported in Table 4.













Very large (>$20B sales)










2 3 4 5 6
0.05 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
0.04 -0.12 0.06 0.06 0.04 0.03






Log (sales) -0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.14 -0.14 -0.13
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Very large (>$20B sales) 0.98 0.88 0.99 0.99 0.97 0.94
(0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45) (0.45)
Pseudo R-sq 4.2% 6.0% 4.2% 4.4% 4.3% 4.1%
Log likelihood -5137.5 -5042.8 -5140.9 -5126.4 -5134.5 -5142.5
Notes: All models are run as multinomial logistic regressions: 0 = incorporation in headquarters state (baseline);
I = incorporation in Delaware; 2 = incorporation in some other state. n = 5,852 in all models. All models in-
clude industry dummies at the two-digit SIC code level and a constant term (not reported). Bold = significant at
95% confidence.
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The top panel reports the results from the outcome "move to
Delaware" (INCORP = 1), while the bottom panel reports the results
from "move to some other (non-headquarters) state" (INCORP = 2).
Pseudo R-sq ranging from 4.1% to 6.0% seems reasonable given the
limited specification of the model. F-tests (unreported) show that all
models are statistically significant at 99% confidence.
Table 4 shows that a company is far less likely to incorporate in
Delaware, at 99% confidence, if its home state has an other constitu-
ency statute, a control share acquisition statute, a business combina-
tion statute, a fair price statute, a pill validation statute, or a more se-
vere (disgorgement or staggered board) statute. All six of these
models support the hypothesis that managers migrate to (or fail to
migrate away from) state antitakeover statutes. In the lower panel, the
results for incorporation in a third state are weaker than the Delaware
results, perhaps because third states in the model are an amalgama-
tion of more and less protective states relative to the headquarters
state. Still, even here, a company is less likely to incorporate in a third
state, at 95% confidence, if the company's headquarters state has a
control share acquisition statute, a pill validation statute, or an ex-
treme (disgorgement or staggered board) statute. Importantly, none
of the antitakeover statute coefficients in Models #1-6, in either the
top or bottom panel, are statistically significant in a positive direction.
2. Full Model
Model #1 in Table 5 shows the results from the full model, which
includes all of the antitakeover statutes that were tested individually in
Table 4.
The top panel of Model #1 shows that control share acquisition
statutes, business combination statutes, and pill validation statutes in
the headquarters state all make Delaware incorporation less likely,
consistent with the findings in Table 4.147 This finding is also consis-
tent with the conventional wisdom among practitioners that control
share acquisition statutes and business combination statutes are the
most important antitakeover statutes among the typical measures
147 Bebchuk and Cohen also find that these three statutes attract more companies,
consistent with the results reported here, and also find a strong timing effect (compa-
nies that went public in the 1990s are less likely to incorporate in their home state)
and a geographic effect (companies located in the south and west are more likely to
incorporate in-state). Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at A-10 tbl.10A, A-11 tbl.IOB.
They do not find the same "overreaching" phenomenon that I discuss in Part IV, nor
do they examine reincorporations or opt-outs from antitakeover statutes.
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passed by states, and that pill validation statutes are also important
"because the right to use poison pill defenses is presumably more se-
cure when explicitly authorized by statute and is thus less likely to be
limited by the courts."
148




Other Constituency 0.18 (0.09) 0.23 (0.10)
Control Share Acquisition -0.96 (0.07) -0.93 (0.08)
Business Combination -0.18 (0.08) -0.15 (0.09)
Fair Price -0.04 (0.10) -0.11 (0.10)
Pill Validation -0.22 (0.08) -0.26 (0.09)
Disgorgement/SB 0.36 (0.12) 0.31 (0.13)
Antitakeover Index -0.16 (0.02) -0.17 (0.02)
Firm Characteristics:
Log (sales) 0.06 (0.01) 0.06 (0.01) 0.15 (0.02) 0.15 (0.02)
Very large (>$20B sales) -0.11 (0.30) -0.02 (0.30) -0.41 (0.32) -0.31 (0.32)
ROA (indexed to industry) -1.35 (0.16) -1.32 (0.16)
Market-to-book (indexed to industry) 0.61 (0.13) 0.62 (0.13)
To some other state (non-headquarters):
State Antitakeover Statutes:
Other Constituency 0.41 (0.16) 0.35 (0.17)
Control Share Acquisition -0.47 (0.12) -0.53 (0.13)
Business Combination -0.01 (0.13) 0.13 (0.14)
Fair Price -0.12 (0.16) -0.07 (0.18)
Pill Validation -0.21 (0.13) -0.26 (0.14)
Disgorgement/SB -0.39 (0.21) -0.41 (0.23)
Antitakeover Index -0.08 (0.03) -0.08 (0.03)
Firm Characteristics:
Log (sales) -0.13 (0.02) -0.13 (0.02) -0.09 (0.03) -0.09 (0.03)
Very large (>$20B sales) 0.85 (0.45) 0.94 (0.45) 0.68 (0.48) 0.81 (0.48)
ROA percentile .0.56 (0.27) -0.51 (0.26)
















Notes: All models are run as multinomial logistic regressions: 0 = incorporation in headquarters state
(baseline); 1 = incorporation in Delaware; 2 =.incorporation in some other state. All models include in-
dustry dummies at the two-digit SIC code level and a constant term (not reported). Bold = significant at
95% confidence.
The magnitude of these coefficients is economically significant.
148
Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, The Wealth Effects of Second-Generation
State Takeover Legislation, 25J. FIN. ECON. 291, 299 (1989); see also MARKJ. ROE, STRONG
MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE
160 (1994) ("[T]he key move probably was when states validated the poison pill, which
can be a show-stopper.").
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Using the method of recycled predictions, I find that the presence of
a control share acquisition statute increases the likelihood of in-state
incorporation by 19%; the presence of a business combination statute
increases the likelihood of in-state incorporation by 3%; and the pres-
ence of a pill validation statute increases the likelihood of in-state in-
corporation by 4% .149 These estimates are roughly additive: I find
that a company headquartered in a state with all three of these stat-
utes is 26% more likely to be incorporated in that state than a com-
pany headquartered in a state without any of these statutes.
Fair price statutes lose their significance in Table 5, suggesting
that the influence of these statutes on the incorporation decision is
not substantial after controlling for the influence of other more po-
tent statutes. 15 Recall that the event studies of fair price statutes were
the only ones among the typical antitakeover statutes that yielded no
statistically significant returns. 151 Thus the one statute that does not
seem to reduce shareholder value also does not influence managers'
incorporation decision.15 2 Constituency statutes also lose their signifi-
cance in the baseline model (at 95% confidence), supporting the
conventional view that these statutes do not have much influence in
takeover contests.
1 5 3
The results for DISGORGESB (representing headquarters in Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, or Pennsylvania) reveal the potential "overreaching"
phenomenon that is discussed in more detail in the next Part. In the
149 The method of recycled predictions compares the in-state incorporation rate in
two hypothetical scenarios: one in which no state has the antitakeover statute of inter-
est; and another in which every state has the antitakeover statute of interest. Without
control share acquisition statutes, the in-state incorporation rate is predicted to be
26.0%; with them, the in-state incorporation rate is 45.0%. Without business combina-
tion statutes, the in-state incorporation rate is 31.6%; with them, 34.7%. Without pill
validation statutes, the in-state incorporation rate is 31.2%; with them, 35.6%.
150 Cf FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 144, at 4-46 ("In a world of poison pills
and business combination statutes, the fair price statutes seem like vestiges of the past,
but they may have some significance to certain corporations and in some circum-
stances.").
151 Supra text accompanying note 126.
152 See ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 83 ("The optimal policy would be repeal
of laws that have been found to affect stock prices adversely-control share acquisition
and business combination freeze statutes.").
153 See, e.g., Bishop, supra note 28, at 21 ("A number of issues are raised by Ne-
vada's [constituency] statute, not the least of which is whether it is necessary at all.").
The one exception might be Pennsylvania's constituency statute, which Conrail used
successfully to defend itself from Norfolk Southern's hostile bid. For an account of the
contest between CSX and Norfolk Southern to acquire Conrail, see Guhan Subrama-
nian, A New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alter-
native to the Poison Pill, 23 DEL.J. CORP. L. 375, 402-11 (1998).
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single-statute model, the coefficient for DISGORGESB is significant
and negative. In the full model, however, the coefficient for
DISGORGESB becomes significant and positive. Note that all three
states that have severe antitakeover statutes also have constituency
statutes, control share acquisition statutes, business combination stat-
utes, and pill validation statutes. In addition, Ohio and Pennsylvania
have fair price statutes, while Massachusetts does not.
1
1
4 Model #1 of
Table 5 shows that after controlling for these more typical antitake-
over statutes, the more potent antitakeover statutes that these states
also have seem to repel companies rather than attract them.
Admittedly, the result for the extreme antitakeover statutes is
more fragile than the results for the more typical antitakeover statutes.
Using a different model specification that includes separate variables
for disgorgement and staggered board statutes, Bebchuk and Cohen
find a statistically significant positive coefficient for the staggered
board statute, but not for the disgorgement statute. 5 In addition,
Bebchuk and Cohen report that the coefficient for the classified
board statute is no longer statistically significant in their model after
controlling for state characteristics. 11 Neither my model nor Bebchuk
and Cohen's, however, yields any evidence that the extreme antitake-
over statutes attract corporations in the same way that control share
acquisition statutes, business combination statutes, and pill validation
statutes seem to. Moreover, the higher opt-out rates by companies in
states with extreme statutes as reported in Part III.A.3 (a factor that is
captured neither in my model nor in Bebchuk and Cohen's) suggest
that these statutes may have revealed limits on states' abilities to en-
trench managers. Part IV provides a theory of antitakeover "over-
reaching" that describes more precisely the source of these potential
limitations.
Control variables are also of interest in Model #1. Larger compa-
nies are more likely to choose Delaware incorporation over their
headquarters state, consistent with the hypothesis that outside counsel
to larger firms are more likely to be from out of state and, possibly as a
consequence, are more likely to recommend Delaware incorporation.
154 Supra Table 3.
155 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 28-29. I find the same result when I sepa-
rate the two statutes: the coefficient for the classified board statute is +1.27 (SE =
0.20), and the coefficient for the disgorgement statute is +0.10 (SE = 0.13).
156 Id. When I control for the same state characteristics in my model I find that
the classified board statute becomes borderline significant: coefficient = +0.51,
SE = 0.26, p-value = 0.052.
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Larger companies are also less likely to choose a third state for incor-
poration, also consistent with this hypothesis. Very large companies
(greater than $20 billion in sales) are not more likely to remain in-
state; other cut-offs for VLARGE (at $30 billion and $15 billion in net
sales) also do not yield statistically significant results. Therefore, I am
unable either to accept or to reject the political influence hypothesis
from these results.
1 57
As a first extension to the baseline model, I construct a new vari-
able HQINDEX, which counts the number of antitakeover statutes in
each state as a rough proxy for the antitakeover protections provided
by the state.5 8 While simplistic, this approach is analogous to the
governance index" constructed in other recent work." 9 I then re-
place the six antitakeover statute dummy variables from Model #1 of
Table 5 with a single variable HQINDEX. Model #2 in Table 5 shows
the results of this extension.
Consistent with the results from Model #1, HQINDEX is negative
and statistically significant at 99% confidence for Delaware incorpora-
tion relative to the headquarters state. This result might suggest that
it is not the specific protections provided by individual antitakeover
statutes, but rather the signal provided by the overall package of stat-
utes, that attracts managers to particular states. I explore this possibil-
ity in more detail in Part III.C.3 below.
In a second extension to the basic model, I include two financial
performance variables: the average market-to-book ratio" over the
157 In an interesting and important result, Bebchuk and Cohen find that large
firms are more likely to incorporate in their headquarters state when their home state
is small. See Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at A-8 tbl.7 (presenting factors inducing
firms to remain in state). Bebchuk and Cohen conclude from this finding that
"[l]arge firms are more likely to be able to benefit from local favoritism in small states,
where they can stand out and have significant clout, than in large states." Id. at 15-16.
158 I thank John Coates for this suggestion. Bebchuk and Cohen adopt a similar
index in their work. See id. at 23 ("Our antitakeover protection index, INDEX, attaches
to each state a score from 0 to 5 that is equal to the number of standard antitakeover
statutes that it has.").
159 See GOMPERS, ISHII, & METRICK, supra note 69 (constructing a governance in-
dex that counts the incidence of twenty-four firm-level takeover defense provisions for
1,500 firms tracked by the Investor Responsibility Research Center). One problem
with the governance index is that firm-level defenses interact. Bebchuk, Coates, &
Subramanian, supra note 19; see alsoJohn C. Coates IV, Takeover Defenses in the Shadow of
the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REv. 271, 325-27 (2000) (discuss-
ing the interaction between pills and shark repellents). Interaction is not as much of
an issue for state antitakeover statutes, which largely function independently of each
other.
160 Following Daines, I define market-to-book ratio as common shares outstanding
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period 1998-2000 and the average return-on-assets (ROAs)' over the
same period, both measured as a percentile ranking across all compa-
nies. Note that including financial performance as independent vari-
ables implies a reverse causation from Daines:162 while Daines argues
that incorporation in Delaware leads to higher Tobin's Q, this specifi-
cation tests the hypothesis that firms with better financial perform-
ance (including higher Q) might be more likely to move to Delaware
or to a third state. Model #3 and Model #4 in Table 5 report the re-
sults of this extension.
Consistent with Daines, Model #3 shows that the coefficient for
market-to-book ratio is statistically significant and positive for Dela-
ware incorporation. While Daines has suggested that this result re-
flects the quality of Delaware law, recent theoretical models demon-
strate that it might be due to network effects and Delaware's well-
developed legal infrastructure. 64 Note, moreover, that the market-to-
book coefficients in the bottom panels of both Model #3 and Model
#4 are larger than the market-to-book coefficients in the top panel. If
the causation does in fact run from corporate law to Q, as Daines ar-
gues, then these findings suggest that the corporate law of non-
Delaware out-of-state incorporation choices provides a (slightly) larger
Q increment than Delaware does, which again casts doubt on the view
that the migration to Delaware represents a race to the top. In cur-
rent work-in-progress, I find that this effect disappears after control-
ling for investment opportunity and firn diversification. 65 In any
case, the correlation between strong performance and Delaware in-
corporation is ambiguous: Model #3 and Model #4 also show a corre-
lation between lower ROA (not higher) and Delaware incorporation.
More important for my purposes here is the point that the basic find-
multiplied by price per common share plus book value of preferred stock plus book
value of debt, divided by book value of assets. See Daines, supra note 14, at 531 (dis-
cussing how market value of stock and replacement costs are determined).
I define return-on-assets as operating income after depreciation divided by to-
tal assets of the prior year.
162 See id. at 555 ("Delaware firms are worth more... [and] the results are robust
to a wide variety of controls for potential endogeneity.").
163 In unreported regressions, I interact categorizations of the financial perform-
ance variables with the antitakeover statutes. These interacted variables, however, are
not significant in any of the models, and their inclusion does not change the other re-
sults in any meaningful way.
164 Bar-Gill, Barzuza, & Bebchuk, supra note 66.
165 Subramanian, supra note 68. Controlling for other parameters, Bebchuk and
Cohen also find no correlation between Delaware incorporation and Tobin's Q in
1999. Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at A-9 tbl.8.
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ings for control share acquisition statutes, pill validation statutes,
business combination statutes (at 90% confidence), and the extreme
statutes continue to hold after basic controls for these financial per-
formance measures.
The one substantive difference between Model #3 and Model #1 is
that the coefficient for constituency statutes is now statistically signifi-
cant in a positive direction, i.e., firms are more likely to incorporate in
Delaware when their home state has a constituency statute, after con-
trolling for the other antitakeover measures that the state has. Con-
stituency statutes are somewhat curious creatures in the antitakeover
arena: on one hand, they seem to give directors broad discretion; 166
on the other hand, econometric studies and other empirical evidence
suggest that constituency statutes have had little influence on the out-
comes of any control contests other than Norfolk Southern's 1997hostle b d fo Co railin n , •167
hostile bid for Conrail in Pennsylvania. Therefore, the fact that they
seem to repel companies after controlling for the other antitakeover
statutes and basic financial performance measures remains something
of a puzzle.
To summarize, the baseline model identifies three effects. First,
most of the typical antitakeover statutes seem to attract (or fail to re-
pel) managers. Second, among the typical statutes, the one that does
not seem to reduce shareholder value (a fair price statute) also does
not seem to influence managerial decision making on choice of in-
corporation. Third, the severe antitakeover statutes provided by Mas-
sachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania do not seem to attract managers
similarly, and, in view of the high opt-out rates from these statutes,
may even repel them. I offer an "overreaching" explanation for this
third result in the next Part.
3. Timing Analysis
One puzzle that is implicit in the analysis thus far is why antitake-
over statutes should matter at all-the argument is that after the poi-
son pill, board control is a prerequisite to gaining control of the com-
pany, but a bidder who gains control of the board can then opt out of
166 See, e.g., Transcript of Record, at 642 (Nov. 19, 1996), Norfolk S. Corp. v. Con-
rail, Inc. (E.D. Pa. 1997) (Nos. 96-7167, 96-7350) (VanArtsdalenJ.) (holding that the
Conrail board can consider "all groups that may be affected by their actions").
167 See supra note 153 (discussing Pennsylvania's constituency statute in the contest
between CSX and Norfolk Southern to acquire Conrail).
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virtually all antitakeover statutes."" Therefore, the typical antitakeover
statutes should have no substantive bite in the "shadow" of the poison
pill. 69 This theoretical argument, however, becomes weaker if the
right to keep the pill is not absolute. For example, in some states, in-
cluding (importantly) California, the right to keep the pill remains
uncertain. 7 ° Even in Delaware, if courts were to allow shareholders to
submit bylaw proposals requiring the board to redeem the pill,' or if
courts were to cut back on the limits of the 'Just Say No" defense,"'
then its antitakeover statute might again have substantive bite. The
findings documented here might be a response to the possibility that
antitakeover statutes will be resuscitated in these or other ways.
Another possibility, not necessarily mutually exclusive, is that the
primary influence of the antitakeover statutes on managers' incorpo-
ration choice occurred in an era when the potency of the pill had not
yet been resolved. In another work, I, with others, document the evo-
lution of the Delaware poison pill case law from the inception of the
poison pill in the mid-1980s to the present.7 3 We show that the ability
to keep the pill was not necessarily absolute until the Delaware Su-
preme Court's decision in Time Warner,174 in 1989, and subsequent il-
lustrations of the 'Just Say No" defense in hostile takeover situations
such as Wallace Compute' 7' and Circon176 in the mid-1990s. Managers
168 Coates, supra note 159, at 321.
169 Id; see also FLEISCHER & SUSSMAN, supra note 144, at 4-12 to 4-13 ("Although
takeover statutes rarely have had a decisive effect on the outcome of takeover contests,
they may afford a target more time and some negotiating leverage.... The importance
of a takeover statute recedes when the target has a poison pill . ).
176 Infra Part III.F.1.
171 See Gen. DataComm Indus., Inc. v. State of Wis. Inv. Bd., 731 A.2d 818, 821 n.1
(Del. Ch. 1999) (noting open nature of this question under Delaware law). Compare
Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-Laws: Taking
Back the Street?, 73 TUL. L. REv. 409, 415-17 (1998) (binding shareholder bylaws not
valid), with Jeffrey N. Gordon, !Just Say Never?" Poison Pills, Deadhand Pills, and Share-
holder-Adopted Bylaws: An Essay for Warren Buffett, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 511, 549 (1997)
(binding shareholder bylaws should be considered valid).
172 See William T. Allen, Jack B. Jacobs, & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Great Takeover De-
bate: A Meditation on Bridging the Conceptual Divide, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. (forthcoming
2002) (manuscript at 47, on file with author), in which two current Vice-Chancellors
and one former Chancellor state that "[i] t is... doubtful that courts would establish a
'bright line' precedent that gives boards a carte blanche to 'just say no.'
173 Lucian Arye Bebchuk, John C. Coates IV, & Guhan Subramanian, The Powerful
Anti-Takeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence and Policy, 55 STAN. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2002) (manuscript at 119-24, on file with author).
174 Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
175 Moore v. Wallace Computer, 907 F. Supp. 1545 (D. Del. 1995).
176 See BRIAN HALL, CHRISTOPHER J. ROSE, & GuHAN SUBRAMANIAN, CIRCON (A)
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may have responded to antitakeover statutes before the potency of the
pill became apparent through the resolution of these takeover con-
tests in the mid-1990s.
To test this hypothesis, I run the full model specified in Table 5
using 1991 incorporation choice and 1995 incorporation choice,
rather than the present incorporation decision. The results are re-
ported in Table 6.
Table 6 shows that the influence of antitakeover statutes on incor-
poration choice documented in present day had largely taken hold by
1995. Model #1 of Table 6 shows that the presence of control share
acquisition statutes and pill validation statutes increased the likeli-
hood that a company would stay in its headquarters state in 1991.
Model #2 shows that the four statutes that are statistically significant in
the 2000 model-control share acquisition statutes, business combina-
tion statutes, pill validation statutes, and disgorgement/SB statutes-
all had the same effect as early as 1995. As a final check, I also run a
panel regression using each firm-year from 1991-2000 as a separate
observation. Model #3 of Table 6 shows that these results are stronger
than the 1991 model but slightly weaker than the 1995 model, per-
haps reflecting the growing influence of these statutes during the
1990s.
Taken together, the results from Table 6 suggest that much of the
influence of antitakeover statutes on incorporation choice had already
occurred by 1995, in an era before the potency of the poison pill was
widely recognized. This finding could reconcile the theoretical pre-
diction regarding antitakeover statutes with the empirical evidence on
managers' responses to them.
(Harvard Bus. Sch., Case Study No. 9-801403, 2001).
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Model # +
Table 6: Incorporation Choice-Timing Analysis




Other Constituency -0.03 (0.12) 0.04 (0.10) 0.05 (0.08)
Control Share Acquisition -0.69 (0.08) -0.83 (0.08) -0.83 (0.06)
Business Combination -0.16 (0.11) -0.24 (0.10) -0.13 (0.07)
Fair Price 0.16 (0.12) 0.10 (0.10) 0.04 (0.08)
Pill Validation -0.34 (0.10) -0.31 (0.09) -0.26 (0.07)
Disgorgement/SB 0.18 (0.13) 0.36 (0.12) 0.31 (0.10)
Firm Characteristics:
Log (sales) 0.10 (0.02) 0.09 (0.01) 0.09 (0.01)
Very large (>$20B sales) 0.09 (0.57) -0.27 (0.50) -0.17 (0.37)
To some other state
(non-headquarters):
State Antitakeover Statutes:
Other Constituency -0.18 (0.18) -0.12 (0.18) -0.02 (0.13)
Control Share Acquisition -0.50 (0.14) -0.66 (0.14) -0.53 (0.10)
Business Combination -0.22 (0.17) -0.22 (0.17) -0.07 (0.10)
Fair Price 0.36 (0.20) 0.34 (0.19) 0.13 (0.14)
Pill Validation -0.35 (0.16) -0.31 (0.15) -0.19 (0.11)
Disgorgement/SB 0.05 (0.24) 0.34 (0.23) -0.04 (0.18)
Firm Characteristics:
Log (sales) -0.09 (0.02) -0.09 (0.02) -0.09 (0.02)













Notes: All models are run as multinomial logistic regressions: 0 = incorporation in headquarters state
(baseline); 1 = incorporation in Delaware; 2 = incorporation in some other state. All models include in-
dustry dummies at the two-digit SIC code level and a constant term (not reported). Bold = significant at
95% confidence. Standard errors reported in Model #3 are robust standard errors.
In their study of the influence of antitakeover statutes on incorpo-
ration choice, Bebchuk and Cohen hypothesize that antitakeover stat-
utes "are possibly important not only in what they actually do but also
in the antitakeover message that they send and the antitakeover com-
mitment that they communicate." 77 This "signaling" hypothesis seems
problematic because it is a signal coming from the state legislature,
about what the courts might potentially do in a takeover contest. As
described above, a more plausible explanation seems to be that: (1)
most of the influence of antitakeover statutes on incorporation choice
had already occurred by the mid-1990s, during a period when the an-
titakeover statutes did potentially have substantive bite; and (2) man-
agers may continue to prefer states with antitakeover protections be-
177 Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 23.
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cause of uncertainty regarding the potency of the pill in the future.
78
To summarize this Part, my results show that managers migrate to
(or fail to migrate away from) control share acquisition statutes, busi-
ness combination statutes, and pill validation statutes. This finding is
generally consistent with the explicit prediction of race-to-the-bottom
theorists179 and inconsistent with the explicit prediction of race-to-the-
top theorists.' s° This finding is robust to alternative specifications of
the model, including basic controls for financial performance, and
does not seem to be driven by any individual state. However, man-
agers do not similarly migrate to the more severe antitakeover statutes
in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. In the next Part, I develop
an "overreaching" theory of antitakeover protection that could ex-
plain these findings. This theory would suggest limitations on the
race to the bottom view.
D. Results from Reincorporating Firms
In the prior Section, I examined the stock of reincorporations as it
existed in 1991, 1995, and (primarily) 2000. I chose this approach for
the basic model instead of the more typical analysis of reincorpora-
tions in order to capture both the explicit decisions to reincorporate
as well as the implicit decisions to not reincorporate. In fact the lat-
ter were far more numerous than the former in the 1990s. The main
drawback with this approach is that it does not distinguish between a
failure to migrate away from antitakeover statutes and an affirmative
migration to antitakeover statutes. While both would be consistent
with the theoretical prediction of the race-to-the-bottom view, most
commentators would consider a proactive move to antitakeover stat-
utes as more problematic than a (passive) failure to move away from
antitakeover statutes.
In this Section, I attempt to distinguish these two stories by exam-
178 1 thank Marcel Kahan for helpful conversations on this point.
179 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1469.
180 Romano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 858.
181 In unreported regressions, I exclude companies headquartered in California,
New York, Texas, and Illinois (individually and collectively) and find that the results do
not change in any significant way. For example, when companies headquartered in all
four states are excluded from the model, the coefficients are -0.62 (SE = 0.09) for con-
trol share acquisition statutes, -0.23 (SE = 0.10) for business combination statutes,
-0.28 (SE = 0.09) for pill validation statutes, and +0.44 (SE = 0.12) for the extreme anti-
takeover statutes. Thus the results do not appear to be driven by the failure of these
four states to adopt certain laws.
182 Supra Part III.B.
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ining the flow of reincorporations for U.S. companies between 1991
and 2000. I run a Cox proportional hazards model... to predict rein-
corporation during the sample period (with "reincorporation" as the
failure event) as a function of: (1) the antitakeover protections pro-
vided by the company's state of incorporation; (2) the antitakeover
protections provided by the company's most likely alternative state of
incorporation, as defined below; and (3) other factors, already intro-
duced in the baseline model, that are thought to influence the incor-
poration decision.
The most likely alternative state is defined using the following
three-part rule. First, for companies incorporated in their headquar-
ters state, the most likely alternative state is assumed to be Delaware.
Second, for companies incorporated in Delaware, the most likely al-
ternative state is assumed to be the company's headquarters state.
These two definitions are consistent with Figure 6, which shows that
the largest migrations during the 1990s were between Delaware and
the company's headquarters state.1s4 Finally, for companies that were
incorporated in neither their headquarters state nor in Delaware, the
most likely alternative state is assumed to be Delaware. This choice is
consistent with Table 2, which documents 57 reincorporations from
other (non-headquarters) states to Delaware and only 36 reincorpora-
tions from other states back to the headquarters state or to some state
other than Delaware. Note that the "alternative state" in the model
represents the most likely alternative state, based on Figure 6 and Ta-
ble 2, and not the actual state of reincorporation. The reason, of
course, is that I do not have an actual state of reincorporation for the
vast majority of companies that did not reincorporate during the sam-
ple period. To maintain consistency between firms that reincorpo-
rated and firms that did not, I use the same alternative state definition
for both, regardless of the state that the reincorporating firms actually
went to.
The results from this model are reported in Table 7:
183 In unreported regressions I run the model as a logit regression and obtain
similar results.
184 Supra Table 2 & Figure 6.
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Table 7: Reincorporation Choice
Model # -b 1 2 3 4
Current State Antitakeover Statutes:
Other Constituency 0.08 (0.27) -0.07 (0.25) -0.07 (0.27)
Control Share Acquisition -0.75 (0.22) -0.70 (0.20) -0.75 (0.21)
Business Combination -1.61 (0.20) -0.96 (0.24) -0.95 (0.25)
Fair Price 0.82 (0.30) 0.19 (0.28) 0.10 (0.29)
Pill Validation -0.30 (0.21) -0.59 (0.21) -0.56 (0.22)
Antitakeover Index -0.38 (0.04)
Alternative State Antitakeover Statutes:
Other Constituency -0.49 (0.30) -0.15 (0.32) -0.11 (0.32)
Control Share Acquisition 0.98 (0.24) 1.72 (0.34) 1.78 (0.35)
Business Combination 0.90 (0.30) -0.06 (0.32) -0.06 (0.32)
Fair Price 0.18 (0.26) 1.09 (0.42) 1.03 (0.42)
Pill Validation -0.32 (0.29) -0.03 (0.30) 0.04 (0.31)
Antitakeover Index 0.33 (0.08)
Firm Characteristics:
OH/MA/PA headquarters? -0.16 (0.27) -0.22 (0.28)
Delaware incorporation? -3.97 (0.50) -4.10 (0.51) -3.50 (0.30)
Home state incorporation? -1.27 (0.18) -1.32 (0.18) -1.20 (0.17)
Log (sales) 0.08 (0.03) 0.11 (0.03) 0.09 (0.04) 0.11- (0.03)
Very.large (>$20B sales) -0.85 (1.03) -0.99 (1.03) -1.04 (1.04) -0.86 (1.03)
ROA percentile 0.08 (0.31)
Market-to-book percentile 0.35 (0.27)
Number of observations 46,081 46,081 40,123 46,081
Log likelihood -1847.5 -1801.0 -1667.4 -1825.9
Notes: All models are run as Cox proportional hazard regressions, in which "failure" is defined as rein-
corporation during the observation year (1991-2000), with multiple failures possible. All models include
industry dummies at the two-digit SIC code level and a constant term (not reported). Bold = significant
at 95% confidence.
The baseline specification (Model #1) shows that incorporation in
a state with a control share acquisition statute or a business combina-
tion statute made reincorporation out of the state during the 1990s
substantially less likely, at 99% confidence. Conversely, the presence
of these two statutes in the most likely alternative state made reincor-
poration substantially more likely, also at 99% confidence. These
findings are consistent with the analysis of the incorporation stock in
both 2000 and 1995, as reported in Tables 5 and 6. However, in the
baseline model, a fair price statute in the current state of incorpora-
tion makes reincorporation more likely, suggesting that companies
may be migrating away from this statute. As noted in Part III.A.2,
however, fair price statutes do not seem to have the same negative
wealth effect as the other statutes do; moreover this effect seems to re-
verse direction in subsequent models, discussed below.
Model #2 controls for home state incorporation, Delaware incor-
poration, and headquarters in Ohio, Massachusetts, or Pennsylvania.
Each of these characteristics might influence the reincorporation de-
cision independent of the actual takeover statutes that are offered.
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For example, a company that is incorporated in its home state might
be less likely to reincorporate away, either for symbolic reasons, or
perhaps for instrumental reasons if the company believes it has influ-
ence in the state legislature. A company that is incorporated in Dela-
ware might reap benefits from Delaware incorporation and so might
be less likely to reincorporate out of Delaware.' Companies head-
quartered in Ohio, Massachusetts, and Pennsylvania also might think
about reincorporation differently due to the more potent antitakeover
statutes in these three states that are not captured elsewhere in the
model.186
The results of this extension are shown in Model #2 of Table 7. A
control share acquisition statute, a business combination statute, and
a pill validation statute in the current state of incorporation all made
reincorporation less likely. This finding is consistent with the results
from Table 5, which shows that the same three statutes also influence
the stock of incorporations in 2000. The coefficients for fair price
statutes are not statistically significant in Model #2, consistent with
Table 5, and confirming that managers do not seem to be influenced
by the one statute that does not have negative wealth effects. The co-
efficient for constituency statutes is also not statistically significant,
consistent with the practitioner view that these statutes are less potent
and, therefore, less important as takeover defenses.
As in Model #1, the presence of a control share acquisition statute
in the alternative state makes reincorporation more likely. Size is also
statistically significant in Model #2 (and all other models), with larger
companies being more likely to reincorporate. This result might be
explained by standard cost-benefit analysis if reincorporation costs are
relatively fixed while benefits increase with size.
Model #2 also shows that companies incorporated in Delaware
were much less likely to reincorporate, as were companies incorpo-
rated in their home state. Further work would need to be done to de-
185 See, e.g., supra note 76 (citing sources that discuss the factors that make Dela-
ware attractive for corporations); see also Bar-Gill, Barzuza, & Bebchuk, supra note 66,
at 7 (arguing that Delaware will price below the value of these benefits in order to de-
ter competitors from entering).186 These statutes are described in more detail in infra Parts IV.A.1 & 2.
187 This finding is also supported by empirical work by Romano, who finds that
16% of reincorporations were motivated by antitakeover reasons, Romano, Some Pieces,
supra note 4, at 252 tbl.4, 256 tbl.6, though she does not draw out the implications of
her finding for the "race" debate, and this finding does not capture non-
reincorporations that were motivated by antitakeover reasons. Supra text accompany-
ing notes 136-137.
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termine whether these findings support the theory that Delaware
firms reap benefits for which they do not pay, and that firms incorpo-
rated in their headquarters have greater loyalty to those states. A
plausible alternative story is that companies that have made a non-
standard choice once (i.e., by incorporating in a third state) are more
likely to reincorporate again.
Model #3 introduces basic controls for financial performance, as
defined in Part III.B. Model #3 provides no evidence that financial
performance (either accounting measures or market measures) influ-
enced the likelihood of reincorporation in the 1990s. Model #4 ag-
gregates the antitakeover statutes into a single "antitakeover index," as
described in Part III.B, both for the current state of incorporation as
well as the alternative state. This model shows that companies were
less likely to reincorporate during the 1990s for each additional anti-
takeover statute in their current state of incorporation. In addition,
Model #4 shows that companies were more likely to reincorporate for
each additional antitakeover statute that the most likely destination
state had. Interestingly, the magnitude of these two effects is ap-
proximately the same (-0.38 on the incumbent side and +0.33 on the
destination side).
To summarize, the results presented in Table 7 provide evidence
that in addition to remaining in states that had the three most impor-
tant antitakeover statutes-control share acquisition statutes, business
combination statutes, and pill validation statutes-companies affirma-
tively moved to states with these same three antitakeover statutes in
the 1990s. The results in this Section are all the more striking because
of the strong bias against finding a result, as described in the specifica-
tion of the baseline model in Part III.B.
E. Assessment
Taken together, these results reject the null hypothesis that state
antitakeover statutes have no influence on the reincorporation deci-
sion. Instead, these results support the view that managers migrate to,
and fail to migrate away from, the typical antitakeover statutes that are
generally acknowledged to reduce shareholder value (business com-
bination statutes, control share acquisition statutes, and pill validation
statutes). Moreover, managers seem to be less influenced, if at all, by
fair price statutes, which do not seem to reduce shareholder value,
and by constituency statutes, which are generally regarded to be a less
potent defense. These conclusions generally support the race-to-the-
bottom view of competition in the corporate charter marketplace, and
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reject the specific prediction of race-to-the-top theorists that managers
will migrate away from antitakeover statutes that reduce shareholder
value.
One plausible objection is reverse causation: rather than compa-
nies choosing their state of incorporation in response to state anti-
takeover statutes, states may pass antitakeover statutes in response to
companies' incorporation choices. Specifically, a state with many out-
of-state companies incorporated in it might be more likely to pass an-
titakeover statutes in order to keep these companies in-state. There
are two responses to this argument. First, state statutes are generally
more "sticky" than incorporation choices. While there are some ex-
amples of state statutes (and antitakeover statutes in particular) being
passed in a matter of weeks or even days, 8 the typical legislative ap-
proval process is time-consuming and costly."" Choice of incorpora-
tion, in contrast, requires little effort beyond the filing of proxy mate-
rials already required in conjunction with the company's annual
meeting. Thus it seems reasonable to model incorporation choice as
responding to state statutes rather than vice versa.9
Second, even if state antitakeover statutes followed incorporation
choice, Table 3 shows that there have been only minor changes in the
states' antitakeover offerings since 1997: two states have added con-
stituency statutes, and two other states have added pill validation stat-
utes. Virtually all U.S. companies, therefore, have made decisions (at
least three times now) on their incorporation choice in an environ-
ment in which antitakeover statutes have been almost entirely exoge-
nously determined. To the extent that companies have stayed where
they are, this represents an implicit choice in favor of the status quo,
but a choice nonetheless.19' Thus even if incorporation choice and
antitakeover statutes were simultaneously determined in the past, it
seems reasonable to model incorporation choice in 2000 as a function
of state antitakeover statutes and not vice versa.
188 For example, Massachusetts' staggered board statute, requiring staggered
three-year terms for directors of all companies incorporated in Massachusetts, was ap-
proved by the state legislature in one day and went into effect the very next day (Apr.
18, 1990). PINNELL, supra note 105, at Massachusetts-5.
189 For example, Connecticut passed its five-year freeze-out law in June 1988 after
.months of public discussion and debate." Id.
190 Roberta Romano develops a model to predict adoption of state antitakeover
statutes, but does not include variables suggested by the discussion here, such as per-
cent of in-state incorporations or percent of out-of-state incorporations. Roberta Ro-
mano, The Political Economy of Takeover Statutes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 142-45 (1987).
191 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1459.
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F. Case Studies
1. California
Two case studies provide some texture to the large-sample results
presented so far. First, California is an important state to understand
in the corporate charter marketplace, not only for its size, but also for
its poor showing in the market for corporate charters. California is
the headquarters of more corporations than any other state (16% by
number and 11% by sales), yet it has only 4% of the corporate charter
market by number and 1% by sales.'" Mostly it has lost these compa-
nies to Delaware: during the 1990s, 84 companies shifted their state
of incorporation from California to Delaware (and only five went the
other way), so that by 2000 a full two-thirds of companies headquar-
tered in California were incorporated in Delaware. This is one of the
highest Delaware incorporation rates among all the states, and much
higher than the national average of 50%.
California is not only losing to Delaware: in 2000, 128 companies
headquartered in California were not incorporated in California or
Delaware, but in some third state. In contrast, only 18 companies
chose California incorporation over their own home state and Dela-
ware. California's market share of the corporate charter market has
declined from 5% to 4% in the 1990s and may continue to decline in
the future.
193
Why is California such a poor player in this market? As described
by the IRRC, "California has long been known for its shareholder
rights stance and its unwillingness to bend to corporate interests." 194
California has no antitakeover statutes, a feature that it shares with
only six other states-Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Montana, New
Hampshire, and West Virginia-which collectively are home to 124
companies but state of incorporation for only 39 of them. In 1988,
192 See also Bebchuk & Cohen, supra note 6, at 27 ("California... retains only 23%
of the firms located in it.").
193 Cf Keith Paul Bishop, Other Views: Businesses Prefer Nevada and Delaware for In-
corporation, SACRAMENTO BEE, Nov. 30, 2001 ("Why are Delaware and Nevada eating
our lunch? Because their legislatures recognize that businesses have a choice and they
have designed corporate laws that reflect an appropriate balance. California has
not.").
194 PINNELL, supra note 105, at California-I; see also CONSTANCE E. BAGLEY, LEGAL
ASPECTS OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 11 (Harvard Bus. Sch.
Case Study No. N9-802-161,Jan. 29, 2002) ("Some jurisdictions, such as Delaware, are
generally viewed as being pro-management. Others, such as California, are more pro-
tective of shareholders, especially minority shareholders.").
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the California Senate Commission on Corporate Governance, Share-
holder Rights, and Securities Transactions reviewed the state's take-
over regime and made a number of pro-shareholder recommenda-
tions. The California legislature quickly acted on these
recommendations and approved bills that provided for disclosure of
proxy voting records, restricted the use of supermajority voting re-
quirements, required an independent fairness opinion in manage-
ment buyouts, and restricted the payment of greenmail. Governor
Deukmejian signed all the proposals into law except the anti-
greenmail provision, on the view that greenmail was "'an essentially
interstate market phenomenon"' and thus better regulated at the fed-
eral level.'9 5
In 1989, California went further by amending its corporate code
to require directors to act not only in "the best interest of the corpora-
tion," but also (explicitly) in the best interest of "its shareholders."'
96
The additional language, essentially amounting to an "anti-
constituency" provision, received substantial attention from California
business lawyers at the time '97 and illustrates the extent of California's
pro-shareholder leanings.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, California has not vali-
dated the "flip-in" poison pill, which is the most common version of
the pill today.'( s The leading treatise on California corporate law sug-
gests that such a pill "appears to be violative" of section 203 of the
California Corporate Code, which prohibits distinctions among
shareholders.' 99 Table 1 shows that eighty-nine companies have mi-
grated away from California and seven companies have migrated into
California since these laws were enacted.
195 PINNELL, supra note 105, at California-2.
196 See CAL. CORP. CODE. § 309(a) (West 1990) ("A director shall perform the du-
ties of a director.., in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation and its shareholders .... ).
197 Interview with Constance E. Bagley, Associate Professor, Harvard Business
School, in Boston, Mass. (Nov. 2, 2001). Professor Bagley was a corporate partner at
McCutchen, Doyle, Brown & Enersen in San Francisco at the time this law was enacted.
198 HAROLD MARSH,JR., R. ROY FINKLE, & LARRY W. SONSINI, MARSH'S CALIFORNIA
CORPORATION LAW § 2.05[F], at 2-50 (4th ed. 2001).
199 Id.; see also E-mail from Keith Paul Bishop, Commissioner of Corporations in
California from 1996 to 1997, to Guhan Subramanian (Feb. 5, 2002) (on file with
author) ("Because pills discriminate against holders, [Section 203] would seem to be a
problem.").
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2. Nevada
In contrast, Nevada has been a successful, if small, player in the
corporate charter marketplace. In 2000, only 0.8% of companies had
their headquarters in Nevada, but 2.8% of U.S. companies are incor-
porated there. (With 217 incorporations, Nevada has more than two-
thirds of California's 331 incorporations.) More strikingly, Nevada
has 15% of the non-Delaware out-of-state incorporations market, sec-
ond only to Maryland. One hundred seventy-five companies chose
Nevada incorporation over their own home state and over Delaware,
compared to only eleven companies headquartered in Nevada which
choose a third state over Nevada and Delaware.
What explains Nevada's relative success? The state has had a con-
trol share acquisition statute since 1987 (one of the earliest),""' a pill
validation statute since 1989,21 a constituency statute since 1991,202
and a business combination statute with a three-year freeze-out provi-
sion since 1991.203 Only eight states provide the same array of protec-
tions as Nevada: Idaho, Indiana, Maryland, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South
Dakota, Tennessee, and Wisconsin. Moreover, Nevada's director li-
ability statute does not mention any particular standard of care,04
"suggest[ing] that a director of a Nevada corporation can be grossly
negligent and still meet the standard of care. 20'  Nevada provides ex-
tremely broad director indemnification provisions, allowing compa-
nies to eliminate or limit the personal liability of directors and officers
for breach of fiduciary duty.20'6 Finally, Nevada has extremely limited
disclosure requirements: Nevada corporations are not required to
publicly disclose the dates and times of annual shareholder and direc-
tor meetings, the number of shares issued and outstanding, or the
identity of its shareholders, all of which could make a hostile takeover
bid more difficult.
207
200 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.378-78.379(3) (Michie 1999).
201 Id. §§ 78.195(5), 78.350(3), & 78.378(3).
202 Id. § 78.138(3)-(4). Unlike many states' statutes, Nevada's constituency statute
applies generally, not just in the change of control context. Id.
203 Id. §§ 78.411-78.444.
204 See id. § 78.138(1) (stating that directors "shall exercise their powers in good
faith and with a view to the interests of the corporation").
205 Bishop, supra note 28, at 20.
206 NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 78.037(1) (Michie 1999); cf. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b) (7) (2001) (prohibiting limitations on director liability for breach of duty of
loyalty, for "acts or omissions not in good faith," or for "any transaction from which the
director derived an improper impersonal benefit").
207 LelandJ. Reicher & Kari H. Endries, Corporations Don't Always Come Out Ahead in
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Taken together, the case studies of California and Nevada provide
anecdotal evidence in support of the general result reported in this
Part. The general proposition is' that companies tend to migrate away
from states such as California, which have few antitakeover protec-
tions, and toward states such as Nevada, which have greater antitake-
over protections. In view of the robust econometric evidence that an-
titakeover statutes reduce shareholder value, these results support the
race-to-the-bottom view. In the next Part, however, I discuss an impor-
tant qualification to this general finding that suggests some limits on
the states' overall race to the bottom.
IV. ANTITAKEOVER "OVERREACHING"
I now return to the puzzle identified in Part III.C: After control-
ling for the typical antitakeover statutes, the extreme antitakeover
statutes in Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania do not seem to at-
tract companies. In addition, companies that remain in Massachu-
setts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania are far more likely to opt out from at
least some portion of these states' antitakeover statutes. In this Part,
I develop a model of antitakeover "overreaching" that explains these
phenomena. The results suggest a more nuanced view of the race de-
bate than has been developed in the literature to date.
Part IV.A describes the Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania an-
titakeover statutes in more detail. Part LV.B presents an overreaching
theory to explain the large-sample results.
A. Description of Severe Antitakeover Statutes
1. Pennsylvania and Ohio
Pennsylvania and Ohio are the only two states with "disgorge-
ment" (or "recapture of profits") statutes. These statutes require bid-
ders to disgorge short-term profits from failed bid attempts and thus
prevent bidders from recouping their bid costs through the usual toe-
hold/greenmail route.' °9 Pennsylvania adopted its law in response to
a hostile tender offer from Canada's Belzberg family for Armstrong
World Industries, a Pennsylvania corporation. The bill was intro-
Nevada, L.A. BuS.J., May 1, 2000, at 32.
208 Supra Part III.A.3.
209 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1707.043 (Anderson 2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2571-75 (West 1995).
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duced in the Pennsylvania legislature in October 1989, in response to
Belzberg's initial posturing, and became effective on April 27, 1990.210
The Pennsylvania statute allows the corporation to recover any profits
from shares sold by the bidder between twenty-four months before
and eighteen months after becoming a "controlling person" of the
company (defined as acquiring or announcing an intent to acquire
20% voting control). 1
Ohio passed its disgorgement statute along with other antitake-
over measures on April 11, 1990. The Ohio statute, unlike the Penn-
sylvania statute, only applies to stock sold by the bidder within eight-
een months after the announcement of the bid 2  Virtually all
commentators agree that these two "innovative" 213 statutes are far
more potent than the more typical antitakeover statutes that other
states have passed.2 4
Most of the econometric analysis has focused on the Pennsylvania
statute, perhaps because it was introduced earlier, even though the
Ohio disgorgement statute actually went into effect first (by two
weeks) .21' All of these studies have found large and statistically signifi-
cant negative wealth effects during the proposal and adoption of the
statute, ranging from 2.5% to 9.1%, with an average loss of 6.0%.16
210 For a summary of the enormous investor and editorial criticism of the statute,
see PINNELL, supra note 105, at Pennsylvania-5 to -7.
211 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2575(1)-(2) (West 1995).
212 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.043(A), (E)(1) (Anderson 2001). The bidder
may gain exemption from the statute by demonstrating to the court that the profits did
not exceed $250,000. Id.
213 Mark E. Crain, Comment, Disgorgement of Greenmail Profits: Examining a New
Weapon in State Anti-Takeover Arsenals, 28 HOUS. L. REV. 867, 869 (1991).
214 See, e.g., Steven M.H. Wallman & Liran A. Gordon, Pennsylvania's Anti-Raider
Legislation, INSIGHTS, Aug. 1990, at 38, 38 (stating that the Pennsylvania antitakeover
statute "has been characterized by the media as the nation's toughest anti-raider legis-
lation").
215 PINNELL, supra note 105, at Ohio-4.
216 See sources cited in PINNELL, supra note 105, at app. C: DONALD MARGOTrA,
STOCK PRICE EFFECTS OF PENNSYLVANIA ACT 36 (Northeastern Univ., Working Paper,
1991) (finding a 5.5% decline); P.R. Chandy et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the
Pennsylvania Fourth Generation Antitakeover Law, 32 AM. Bus. L.J. 399, 433 (1995) (2.5%
decline); Jonathan M. Karpoff & Paul H. Malatesta, Pennsylvania Law: State Antitakeover
Laws and Stock Prices, 46 FIN. ANALYSISJ. 8 (1990) (5.8% decline); Stephen L. Nesbitt,
The Impact of Antitakeover Legislation on Pennsylvania Common Stock Prices, WILSHIRE
ASSOCIATES, Apr. 23, 1990 (4% decline); L. Mick Swartz, The 1990 Pennsylvania Anti-
takeover Law: Should Firms Opt Out of Antitakeover Legislation?, 11 J. ACCT., AUDITING &
FIN. 223 (1996) (9.0% decline); Samuel H. Szewczyk & George P. Tsetsekos, State Inter-
vention in the Market for Corporate Control The Case of Pennsylvania Senate Bill 1310, 31 J.
FIN. ECON. 3 (1992) (9.1% decline).
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Both Pennsylvania and Ohio permit corporations to opt out of
these statutes, 7 and to varying degrees, companies in both states
have. Romano reports that 64% of identified firms (127 out of 199)
opted out either completely or partially from the Pennsylvania anti-
takeover statute.1 8 From my sample of 2,421 firms tracked by the
IRRC, I similarly found that 59% of Pennsylvania companies (44 out
of 74) opted out in some way. For Ohio, I found that 11% of compa-
nies (9 out of 80) opted out of at least some aspects of the statute,
higher than the 2-6% opt-out rate for Delaware companies, 2 9 but sub-
stantially lower than the Pennsylvania opt-out rate. This difference
may be due to the fact that Pennsylvania companies could only opt
out in the first ninety days after the statute went into effect;22 in con-
trast, boards can opt out from the Ohio statute at any time.
2. Massachusetts
On April 17, 1990 (within days of the effective date of both the
Pennsylvania and Ohio statutes), Massachusetts adopted legislation
requiring most Massachusetts corporations to have staggered boards
221
of directors, with one-third of the directors being elected each year.
The statute was adopted after BTR, a British industrial manufacturer,
announced an unsolicited tender offer and a proxy fight for Norton
222
Company. While all states allow staggered boards, Massachusetts is
the only state that provides this defense via statute. In other work, I
with others show that an "effective" staggered board, when combined
with a poison pill, is a very potent defense against a potential hostile
bidder. 223 Thus, the Massachusetts statute provides a powerful mecha-
nism for board entrenchment.
217 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1707.043 (Anderson 2001); 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §
2571 (b) (2) (West 1995).
28 Seventeen percent opted out completely; another 25% opted out of certain
provisions; and only 23% did not opt out at all (another 35% were unidentified). Ro-
mano, Lesson, supra note 4, at 859 tbl. 1.
219 Supra text accompanying note 129.
220 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2571(b) (2) (West 1995); see alsoJason Shargel, Opt-
ing Out of the New Pennsylvania Anti-Takeover Law, INSIGHTS, July 1990, at 29, 29 ("Once
this 90 day opt out period expires, it will never be available (even with shareholder ap-
proval) again, and the corporation will be frozen into the new Act's provisions .....
MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 156B, § 50A (Law. Co-op. 1996).
222 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(d) (2001) (outlining the organization of
directors); MODEL Bus. CORP. ACT § 8.06 (1984) (discussing staggered terms for direc-
tors).
223 Bebchuk, Coates, & Subramanian, supra note 173, at 119.
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Two studies have examined the wealth effects of the Massachusetts
staggered board antitakeover statute: Swartz finds a remarkable 16%
decrease in shareholder value for Massachusetts firms that did not
previously have takeover defenses;22 4 Daines finds a more moderate
but still statistically significant 2% drop in value.225 Companies could
opt out from the Massachusetts statute either through board vote or
through a two-thirds vote by shareholders. In my IRRC sample de-
scribed above, 42% of Massachusetts companies (25 out of 59) opted
out of at least some aspects of the statute.
B. A Theory ofAntitakeover Overreaching26
The previous Section demonstrates that managers' responses to
the severe antitakeover statutes in Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Massachu-
setts are different from their responses to the more typical antitake-
over statutes: I find no evidence that companies migrate to the ex-
treme statutes in the same way that they migrate to some of the typical
statutes; moreover, companies in states with extreme statutes opt out
from these statutes at a higher rate than companies in other states.
Prior empirical analyses have failed to explain (or recognize) this
difference between the typical antitakeover statutes and the three se-
vere statutes. In this Section, I offer a theory that explains this differ-
ence, drawing from Bebchuk's distinction between "significantly dis-
tributive"2 2 7 and "insignificantly distributive, 228 corporate law rules.
1. Distributive Element of Severe Antitakeover Statutes
Bebchuk examines both the benefit to the manager (the "distribu-
224 L. Mick Swartz, The Massachusetts Classified Board Law, 22 J. ECON. & FIN. 29
(1998).
225 Robert Daines, Do Staggered Boards Affect Firm Value? Massachusetts and the
Market for Corporate Control (2001) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
226 To my knowledge no one has previously used the term "antitakeover overreach-
ing," though David Charny suggested something similar in 1991. See David Charny,
Competition Among Jurisdictions in Formulating Corporate Law Rules: An American Perspective
on the "Race to the Bottom" in the European Communities, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 423, 446
(1991) ("[Vlarious constraints would prevent managers from flocking to reincorporate
[to states whose laws were] ... egregiously permissive .... ). Bebchuk made a similar
prediction in 1992. Infta note 238.
227 Bebchuk defines "significantly distributive" issues as issues in which "the dis-
tributive element is significant relative to the efficiency element." Bebchuk, supra note
6, at 1461.
28 Bebchuk defines "insignificantly distributive" issues as issues in which "the dis-
tributive element is very small relative to the efficiency element." Id.
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tive element") and the cost to shareholders (the "efficiency element").
On the first, it is clear that the severe antitakeover statutes provide a
benefit to disloyal managers in the form of increased entrenchment
and the opportunity for extracting larger private benefits of control.
The Massachusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania statutes have substantive
bite because they provide protection from the takeover market that
companies cannot achieve on their own. This fact would suggest that
the distributive element is large.
However, the increased voice of institutional investors during the
1990sI29 and the resulting improvements in corporate governance210
may have reduced the benefit that managers derive from the severe
statutes. The reason is that migrating to one of the states with a severe
statute sends an adverse signal to the marketplace in a way that mi-
grating to the more typical statutes does not. For companies not
headquartered in Massachusetts, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, reincorporat-
ing to these states would create a presumption among shareholders
that the move is being made for antitakeover reasons. In contrast, re-
incorporation to states with other, more typical (and hence less
prominent) antitakeover statutes (e.g., Delaware or Nevada) could be
justified using non-takeover-related reasons, even if, as demonstrated
in this Article, takeover concerns seem to motivate many incorpora-
tion and reincorporation decisions.
It would be exceedingly difficult for managers to get shareholder
approval for moving to Massachusetts, Ohio, or Pennsylvania, unless
the move were packaged with other proposals that, in total, increased
shareholder value.23' Managers, therefore, will be reluctant to bring
such proposals to shareholders in view of the low likelihood of suc-
cess. 22 The few managers who bring such proposals and are successful
in reincorporating to these states would suffer personally from the an-
229 See Roberta Romano, Less Is More: Making Institutional Investor Activism a Valu-
able Mechanism of Corporate Governance, 18 YALE J. ON REG. 174, 175-76 (2001) (docu-
menting the rise of institutional investors in monitoring activities since 1986).
230 See Daniel P. Hann, Emerging Issues in U.S. Corporate Governance: Are the Recent
Reforms Working?, 68 DEF. COUNS. J. 191, 205 (2001) (stating that "in some instances"
institutional investors have "improved information, enhanced accountability, and
probably helped to correct certain abuses"); see also Romano, supra note 229, at 177
(noting that improved corporate governance has not led to noticeable improvements
in corporate performance, and proposing ways to achieve this connection).
213 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1475.
232 See BRUCE WASSERSTEIN, BIG DEAL 712-13 (1998) ("A wholesale defensive strat-
egy is also available-reincorporating in a state with laws more favorable to takeover
defense.... [However, r]eincorporation should be pursued only if a company expects
to win the necessary shareholder approval.").
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titakeover presumption, either through increased likelihood of termi-
nation or through increased monitoring by investors wary of the
move. Netting these costs against the benefits of increased entrench-
ment may make the distributive element relatively small for the severe
antitakeover statutes compared to the distributive element for the
more typical antitakeover statutes. 33
2. Efficiency Element of Severe Antitakeover Statutes
Moving to the second part of Bebchuk's analysis, the econometric
evidence suggests that the cost to shareholders of the severe antitake-
over statutes may be greater than the cost to shareholders. of the typi-
cal antitakeover statutes. While studies of both types of statutes gen-
erally find that they reduce shareholder value, studies of the typical
statutes generally find a 2-3% decline in shareholder wealth, com-
pared to an average 6% decline for studies assessing the Pennsylvania
statute234 and an average 9% decline for studies assessing the Massa-
chusetts statute.23' These results are consistent with a qualitative as-
sessment of the two types of statutes: while the typical antitakeover
statutes may have (at most) mild substantive bite for most companies,
the severe antitakeover statutes substantially shut down the market for
corporate control as a disciplining device. The difference in esti-
mated shareholder wealth effects may be reflecting this fact. Thus, it
seems reasonable to believe that the (negative) efficiency element for
the severe antitakeover statutes is larger than the (also negative) effi-
ciency element for the more typical statutes.
3. Assessment
If, as argued above, the distributive element is smaller and the ef-
ficiency element is larger for the severe antitakeover statutes relative
to the more typical antitakeover statutes, then it might be the case that
the severe antitakeover statutes are insignificantly redistributive rela-
tive to the typical statutes. 3 6 Bebchuk argues that "market discipline
will probably discourage managers from seeking inefficient rules with
233 Note that the costs of the reincorporation need not outweigh the benefits in
order to make the move unlikely; rather, they need to make the benefits "insignificant"
relative to the costs to shareholders. Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1464.
234 See supra note 216 (citing sources).
235 See supra notes 224-25 (citing sources).
236 Note that accepting either the distributive element story or the efficiency ele-
ment story is sufficient to reach this conclusion.
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respect to insignificantly redistributive issues, [though] it is unlikely to
have such an effect with respect to significantly redistributive issues. ", 3'
Applying this theoretical prediction to the context of the antitakeover
statutes, managers should migrate to the "significantly redistributive"
typical antitakeover statutes and not migrate to the "insignificantly re-
distributive" severe antitakeover statutes.3 8 Of course, this is precisely
the effect I report from the large-sample evidence in Part III.
Note that the market discipline that I depend on cannot come
from the market for corporate control, because the severe antitake-
over statutes effectively cut this off as a disciplining device.239 Instead,
the more likely disciplining device is the managerial labor market:
managers who migrate to states with severe antitakeover statutes will
suffer a private loss from the increased likelihood of termination. In
fact the empirical evidence suggests that this market has been quite
vibrant in the 1990s, and therefore reliance on it as a disciplining de-
vice is not unfounded.
This overreaching theory suggests that states, in their effort to at-
tract corporate charter business, must be careful to craft antitakeover
statutes that are significantly redistributive rather than insignificantly
redistributive. Put differently, statutes that excessively entrench man-
agers, and do so in an atypical way, may actually repel companies
rather than attract them. Thus, states such as Massachusetts, Ohio,
and Pennsylvania may have overreached in the corporate charter
marketplace.
Georgia may in fact provide a negative example of this overreach-
ing theory. In 1997, the Georgia legislature rejected a mandatory
staggered board statute similar to the Massachusetts statute, on the
grounds that it would make Georgia corporations less attractive to in-
237 Bebchuk, supra note 6, at 1462. With significantly redistributive issues, the pri-
vate benefits to managers outweigh managers' interest in promoting shareholder wel-
fare. With insignificantly redistributive issues, the reverse is true. See id. at 1462-63
(discussing the inverse relationship between redistributive issues and private benefits
to managers).
238 Bebchuk makes the same prediction less formally. See id. at 1468 ("[C]onsider
a rule that makes a takeover virtually impossible. Such a rule may reduce the value of a
large company by two billion dollars while providing the managers with extra security
worth only twenty million dollars.").
239 Cf id. at 1470 ("[B]ecause [antitakeover] rules weaken the disciplinary force of
the market for corporate control, market discipline can hardly be relied on to discour-
age managers from seeking these rules.").
240 See RAKESH KHURANA, TRANSITIONS AT THE TOP: CEO POSITION AS OPEN &
CLOSED TO COMPETITION 23 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper, 2001) (describing
the effect of the market as a tool for disciplining and removing management).
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vestors. 41 While at least one commentator views this as evidence in
support of the race-to-the-top view (i.e., away from antitakeover stat-
utes),242 my analysis suggests that this race-to-the-top exists only among
the extreme antitakeover statutes. In the next Part, I review a state
that made the opposite decision from Georgia.
V. IMPLICATIONS
The results presented in this Article have important implications
for the most recent development in the U.S. corporate charter mar-
ketplace, the Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act of 1999.243 More
broadly, my findings have implications for takeover regulation in the
United States and for the emerging charter competition in the Euro-
pean Union. Each of these issues is discussed in greater detail in the
remainder of this Part.
A. The Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act of 1999
The Maryland Unsolicited Takeover Act (MUTA) was signed into
law on June 1, 1999. It contains an array of potent takeover defenses:
for example, a broad constituency provision, which allows directors to
reject a takeover bid because of the effect that the acquisition would
have on nonshareholder constituencies;144 and a pill validation provi-
sion, which codifies common law endorsement of the pill in Mary-
land, 2 4' but then goes further to allow continuing director (slow-hand)
pills. 246 MUTA also rejects Delaware's heightened scrutiny for director
241 Carney, supra note 52, at 756. Although this incident has not received much
attention in the race debate, Professor Carney's account is based on his own firsthand
experience participating in the legislative process. Id. at 756 n.153.
242 Id. at 756.
243 MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS §§ 3-801 to 3-805 (1999).
244 Id. at §§ 2-104(b) (9), 2-405.1 (d) (5) (ii) (1997).
245 See Realty Acquisition v. Prop. Trust of Am., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 95,245
(Md. 1989) (upholding a shareholder rights plan under Maryland corporate law).
246 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-201 (c) (2) (ii) (Supp. 2001) (allowing di-
rectors to limit the power of future directors to vote for redemption, modification, or
termination of shareholder rights plans for up to 180 days). In contrast, Delaware has
rejected slow-hand and dead-hand poison pills. See Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Sha-
piro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 1998) (invalidating slow-hand pill); Carmody v. Toll Bros.,
Inc., 723 A.2d 1180, 1195 (Del. Ch. 1998) (allowing a claim challenging a dead-hand
pill to survive summary judgment); see also Bank of New York Co. v. Irving Bank Corp.,
528 N.Y.S.2d 482, 485-86 (Sup. Ct. 1988) (invalidating a dead-hand pill under New
York law). But see AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Inc., No. 98-4405, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
15617, at *34-35 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 1998) (upholding slow-hand pill under Pennsylvania
corporate law), rev'd sub nom. AMP Inc. v. Allied Signal Corp., 168 F.3d 649 (3d Cir.
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conduct in sale of control situations47 and instead provides that direc-
tors' actions will be assessed under the business judgment rule and
"may not be subject to a higher duty or greater scrutiny than is ap-
plied to any other act of a director."2 48 In effect this provision extends
the 'Just Say No" defense that Delaware courts have permitted for
strategic, stock-for-stock mergers249 to all sale of control situations in
Maryland.
Finally, the Maryland statute allows Maryland corporations to
adopt a staggered board without shareholder approval, and even ifS 250
contrary to the firm's charter. MUTA also provides collateral provi-
sions that make the staggered board "effective,"25' thereby preventing
a hostile bidder from dismantling the board by soliciting written con-
252
sents or by calling a special meeting. Instead, a hostile bidder must
wait through two annual meetings, which can take as long as two
253
years, in order to gain control of the board and then take control of
254
the company.
1999); Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Techs., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1580-81 (N.D. Ga.
1997) (upholding dead-hand pill under Georgia corporate law).
247 Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
248 MD. CODE. ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 2-405.1 (f) (1999).
249 See Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del.
1989) ("Directors are not obliged to abandon a deliberately conceived corporate plan
for a short-term shareholder profit unless there is clearly no basis to sustain the corpo-
rate strategy."). For a federal district court opinion that appears to broaden 'Just Say
No" beyond the strategic merger context, see Moore Corp. Ltd. v. Wallace Computer
Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1545, 1553-64 (D. Del. 1995).
250 MD. CODE ANN., CORPS. & ASS'NS § 3-803 (1999 & Supp. 2001).
251 If directors adopt a staggered board under MUTA, directors may be removed
only for cause and with the vote of at least two-thirds of shareholders, id. §3804(a)
(Supp. 2001), the number of directors may only be determined by the board, id.
§ 3-804(b), vacancies on the board can only be filled by current directors, id.
§ 3-804(c) (2), and special meetings can only be called on the written request of a ma-
jority of shareholders, id. § 3-805(1) (1999). All of these provisions apply even if con-
trary to the charter or bylaws of the company. Id. § 3-802(a) (2) (ii), (d)(3). In addi-
tion, Maryland corporate law does not permit shareholder action through written
consent.
252 SeeJohn C. Coates IV, Measuring the Domain of Mediating Hierarchy: How Contest-
able Are U.S. Public Corporations?, 24J. CORP. L. 837, 854 & n.95 (1999) (describing the
development of poison pills and classified boards); Bebchuk, Coates, & Subramanian,
supra note 19 (documenting the interactions among takeover defenses that are re-
quired to construct an "effective" staggered board).
253 See, e.g., HALL, ROSE, & SUBRAMANIAN, supra note 176 (documenting U.S. Sur-
gical's hostile bid against Circon's effective staggered board, which remained outstand-
ing for almost two years and two annual shareholder meetings before being with-
drawn).
254 For empirical evidence on the difficulty of this route, see Bebchuk, Coates, &
Subramanian, supra note 173.
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Unsurprisingly, institutional investors and shareholder activists
have criticized MUTA. 25' Academic commentators have yet to ac-
knowledge MUTA in the "race" debate-for example, there have not
yet been any event studies examining the shareholder wealth impact
of MUTA. Clearly, race-to-the-top proponents will have difficulty rec-
onciling their view with this statute, by far the most severe among sec-
ond-generation antitakeover statutes. The overreaching theory pre-
sented here, however, suggests that MUTA might be ineffective in
attracting companies to Maryland.
B. Takeover Regulation in the United States
Beyond Maryland, the results presented here also have implica-
tions for the broader question of takeover regulation in the United
States. The typical policy proposal from race-to-the-bottom propo-
nents has been increased federalization of corporate law.25 1 Recently,
Lucian Bebchuk and Allen Ferrell have proposed a variation on this
solution, a "federal choice-enhancing intervention," which would pro-
vide a body of federal takeover law and a mandatory process rule al-
lowing shareholders to opt-in to this federal regime. 57
The statistics and case studies presented in this Article suggest that
the federal regime is not the critical aspect of the Bebchuk and Ferrell
proposal.25 " The shareholder-friendly takeover environment that they
envision being provided by the federal government is already pro-
vided in large part by California.259 While Bebchuk and Ferrell de-
scribe the basic asymmetry favoring targets in state corporate law (be-
cause state law regulates in-state companies as targets but not as
255 PINNELL, supra note 105, at Maryland-4.
256 See, e.g., NADER, GREEN, & SELIGMAN, supra note 9, at 62-71 (arguing that fed-
eral chartering is compelling because state chartering "is a costly anachronism"); Cary,
supra note 5, at 701-02 (proposing a Federal Corporate Uniformity Act to apply to all
corporations with over $1 million of assets and 300 shareholders).
257 Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 143-49; see also Bratton &
McCahery, supra note 53, at 1926 (proposing, more generally, "a federally mandated
privilege of direct shareholder access to amend the corporate charter at the annual
meeting of shareholders").
258 While Bebchuk and Ferrell agree that "[tihe addition of a mandatory federal
process rule would by itself be a significant improvement," id. at 154, they argue that
the federal choice is also important because the federal government "would be a dif-
ferent type of player with different incentives from the typical state," id. at 151. In this
Part, I build on the work of prior commentators who argue that the incentives in fact
are not that different at the federal level.
259 Supra Part III.F. 1.
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acquirers) , they fail to identify California's apparent ability to resist
261these antitakeover forces. It is possible that a federal takeover re-
gime would go further than California-for example, adopting the
British City Code's sweeping prohibition on "any action" made with-
out shareholder approval that could frustrate a takeover attempt
(which would, most importantly, severely restrict the ability for a tar-
get board to use a pill). However, it seems unlikely that the federal
government would go so far, because the reasons that political proc-
esses favor targets would continue to exist at the federal level. A
common argument, put forward most forcefully by Romano, is that
the beneficiaries of antitakeover legislation (managers and employ-
ees) are a concentrated group, while the group bearing the costs of
262
such legislation (shareholders) is diffuse. As just one manifestation
of this point, Romano reports that 18% of witnesses at congressional
hearings on takeover legislation from 1963 to 1987 were target man-
agers, compared to only 6% of witnesses who were takeover bidders.263
Perhaps as a result of this imbalance, Romano finds an "overwhelm-
ingly one-sided (antibidder) aspect of bills that have persistently been
on Congress's agenda over the years."
264
,
It is possible that the rise of institutional investors in the 1990s
would solve the diffusion problem that Romano identifies. However,
in other work, I, with George Baker, provide evidence on the global
market for corporate control suggesting another antitakeover tilt, one
that would exist even more at the federal level than at the state level.
While the increasing globalization of the M&A marketplace is well-
known,265 and the fact that the largest cross-border flows are between
North America (basically the United States) and the European Union
is perhaps equally unsurprising, we find that these flows are distinctly
one-way: during the 1990s takeover wave, European companies
bought American companies at a far greater rate than American com-
260 Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 134-35.
261 See id. at 140 (analyzing the "persistent and uniform tendency of states to pro-
vide considerable protection to incumbents"); id. at 151 (describing incentives to pro-
vide "substantial antitakeover protections as do all the states currently").
262 ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 75.
263 See id. at 77 tbl.4-3 (reporting that out of a total of 255 witnesses at congres-
sional hearings, 46 were target managers and 15 were takeover bidders).
264 Id. at 80.
265 See, e.g., Bernard S. Black, The First International Merger Wave (and the Fifth and
Last U.S. Wave), 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 799, 800-01 (2000) (presenting evidence that re-
cent takeover activity can fairly be categorized as the first international wave of mergers
and acquisitions).
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panies bought European companies. European acquisitions of
American companies amounted to almost $700 billion in the 1990s
(22% of total acquisitions by European acquirers and 13% of total ac-
quisitions of North American targets), compared to approximately
$250 billion in American acquisitions of European companies (6% of
total acquisitions by North American acquirers and 10% of total ac-
quisitions of European targets). Fourteen of the twenty-five largest
cross-continent M&A deals involved U.S. targets; only three involved
267U.S. acquirers. If the political forces that are responsible (at least in
part) for these flows persist in the future, the trends that we report for
the 1990s takeover wave would continue, and targets' interests would
be represented more than bidders' interests in a hypothetical federal
regime.
Thus, I am less optimistic than Bebchuk and Ferrell in the ability
of the federal government to provide a more pro-takeover regime
than California currently provides. However, the second prong of
their proposal-a mandatory process rule allowing shareholders
choice on the incorporation decision-responds precisely to the defi-
ciency in corporate charter competition identified in this Article.
Note that the problem is primarily (though not exclusively) a problem
of omission: managers are failing to bring proposals to either opt out
or reincorporate away from states that pass antitakeover statutes.
Bebchuk and Ferrell's mandatory process rule would release share-
holders from managers' agenda-setting power on incorporation
choice, and possibly could trigger a wave of reincorporations toward
more takeover-friendly regimes.
In Bebchuk and Ferrell's proposal, the only alternative to man-
agement's chosen state of incorporation is the federal regime,268 which
266 George P. Baker & Guhan Subramanian, The Global Market for Corporate
Control (unpublished data, on file with author). Though the vast majority of these
deals were friendly, takeover defenses are nevertheless relevant because friendly deals
are often negotiated in the "shadow" of a hostile bid. Cf G. William Schwert, Hostility
in Takeovers: In the Eyes of the Beholder?, 55 J. FIN. 2599, 2638 (2000) (finding that
friendly deals are not distinguishable from hostile deals along standard economic
measures); Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 951 (1979) (demonstrating how the "shadow
of the law" provides endowments that influence outcomes in the divorce context).
267 Baker & Subramanian, supra note 266.
268 This point is not completely clear. Compare Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach,
supra note 6, at 147 (" [C] hoice-enhancing intervention includes a mandatory vote pro-
cedure by which shareholders can choose to have their corporation governed by the
federal takeover rules rather than that of their corporation's state of incorporation."),
with id. at 162-63 ("[T]he federal process rule would establish a process by which com-
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(as argued above) is unlikely to provide a more pro-takeover envi-
ronment than California currently provides. Because a reasonably full
spectrum already exists among the U.S. states, I propose that choice
should be broadened to allow shareholders to opt in to any state, ef-
fectively putting incorporation decisions in shareholders' hands
rather than in managers' hands. The desirable feature of this modest
modification is that it eliminates the need for federal intervention be-
yond the imposition of the mandatory choice rule. The drawback is
that it maintains (and arguably broadens) shareholder encroachment
on a decision that has traditionally been entrusted to the board.2
69 It
is not clear from Bebchuk and Ferrell's analysis what makes the rein-
corporation decision different from other board decisions that are po-
tentially "significantly redistributive." Viewed in this way, their pro-
posal becomes quite radical, for it begins a shift in the conventional
allocation of powers between shareholders and the board in a way that
has no clear limits. While Oklahoma and Georgia have addressed this
issue in a related context,2 ° the fundamental policy questions that are
implicit in the Bebchuk and Ferrell proposal are still outstanding in
271
Delaware and in all other states.
C. Regulatory Competition in the European Union
Finally, the results presented in this Article have implications for
the regulatory competition debate within the European Union (EU).
To date, competition for corporate charters in the EU has been ex-
tremely limited, for three reasons. First, a number of EU countries
endorse the "real seat" doctrine, which requires companies to be in-
panies could switch from one state to another and, in particular, would make it possi-
ble for shareholders to initiate and approve such switches...."). Overall, Bebchuk
and Ferrell seem to be describing a binary choice between current state regime and
the federal regime, id. at 113, 115-16, 156, which suggests that my approach would be a
(minor) modification to their proposal.
269 CLARK, supra note 27, at 105-06. Choi and Guzman offer a similar critique.
Stephen J. Choi & Andrew T. Guzman, Choice and Federal Intervention in Corporate Law,
87 VA. L. REv. 961 (2001).
270 See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Fleming Cos., 1999 OK 3, 22, 975 P.2d 907, 912
(holding that shareholders may propose bylaws amendment to redeem the pill, pro-
vided that the certificate of incorporation does not provide otherwise); Invacare Corp.
v. Healthdyne Techs., 968 F. Supp. 1578, 1582 (N.D. Ga. 1997) (concluding that plain-
tiff's proposed bylaw "would infringe upon the board's discretion by requiring the in-
cumbent.., board to remove the continuing director provision").
271 See, e.g., Geoffrey Colvin, Shareholders of the World: Sue!, FORTUNE, Mar. 19, 2001,
at 50 ("Who's really in charge of your company?... The amazing fact is that the an-
swer to this question.., is a big muddle.").
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corporated where they have their headquarters (in contrast to the
272U.S.-style "incorporation theory" doctrine). Second, reincorpora-
tions are typically treated as liquidations of the company, which trig-
ger tax recognition on appreciated assets.17' Third, while EU coun-
tries impose initial incorporation fees, they do not impose annual
taxes, which should in theory reduce the incentive for countries to
compete for midstream corporate charters.
274
However, two recent developments may open the door for U.S.-
style charter competition in Europe. First, in March 1999, the Euro-
pean Court ofJustice (ECJ) ruled in the Centros case that Articles 43275
and 482713 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community require
a Member State to register a branch of a company formed in accor-
dance with the law of another Member State, even if the company
conducts no business in the state where it is incorporated.277 Though
the scope of the decision remains uncertain, some commentators in-
272 Most importantly, Germany, France, and Portugal, apply the "real seat" theory.
Sorensen & Neville, supra note 26, at 184. Germany's Sitztheorie, for example, requires
a company having its principal place of business in Germany to incorporate under
German law; conversely a company that has its headquarters outside of Germany can-
not incorporate under German law. Id. at 185-86. In contrast, the Netherlands, Ire-
land, Denmark, and the United Kingdom apply the U.S.-style incorporation theory of
regulation, i.e., a company is regulated by the country in which it is incorporated,
which can differ from where it is headquartered or does business. Id. at 183.
273 See id. at 185 ("A transfer of the head office requires dissolution of the corpora-
tion in the state of departure.., and reincorporation in the state of arrival.").
274 ROMANO, GENIUS, supra note 4, at 134.
275 Article 43 of the Treaty Establishing the European Community reads, in rele-
vant part:
[R]estrictions on the freedom of establishment of nationals of a Member State
in the territory of another Member State shall be prohibited. Such prohibi-
tion shall also apply to restrictions on the setting up of agencies, branches or
subsidiaries by nationals of any Member State established in the territory of
any Member State.
Treaty Establishing the European Community, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 43, reprinted in
EUROPEAN UNION: SELECTED INSTRUMENTS TAKEN FROM TREATIES 117 (1999).
276 Article 48 reads, in relevant part:
Companies or firms formed in accordance with the law of a Member State and
having their registered office, central administration or principal place of
business within the Community shall, for the purposes of this Chapter, be
treated in the same way as natural persons who are nationals of Member
States.
Id. at art. 48, reprinted in EUROPEAN UNION, supra note 275.
277 See Case C-212/97, Centros Ltd. v. Erhvervs-og Selskabsstyrelsen, 1999 E.C.R.
1-1459, [1999] 2 C.M.L.R. 551, 552 (holding that the "refusal to register constituted an
obstacle to the exercise of the freedom of establishment").
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terpret Centros as rejecting the "real seat" doctrine in the EU .
While Centros arguably has cleared one obstacle to corporate char-
ter competition, the European Commission is seeking to clear another
obstacle through its draft Fourteenth Company Law Directive. In
1993, the Commission retained the consulting firm KPMG to examine
company migration in Europe. The resulting report endorsed the in-
corporation theory of corporate charters and recommended the facili-
tation of company movement by allowing reincorporation without
279
liquidation within the EU. In 1998, the European Commission an-
nounced that it would act on the KPMG recommendation by formu-
lating and proposing a draft Fourteenth Company Law Directive. The
proposal has been published, although it has not yet been formally ta-
bled for the European Union Council of Ministers.2 80
It will take future ECJ case law to clarify the degree to which the
Centros decision rejects the seat theory in the EU. s1 Moreover, given
the notoriously slow EU legislative process, it may take years (if not
decades) before the Fourteenth Company Law Directive becomes ef-
fective.8 2 Still, the overall movement in the EU seems to be toward
greater regulatory competition, through a broadening of the mutual
recognition requirements (Centros) and a reduction in other barriers
to reincorporation (Fourteenth Directive). This trend may have been
influenced by the current conventional wisdom from the U.S. experi-
ence with corporate charter competition. EU authority Eddy
Wymeersch, for example, cites Romano for the proposition that the
U.S. experience is a "race for excellence," and suggests that Centros
similarly could lead to a race to the top.183 However, the evidence pre-
sented in this Article casts doubt on this characterization of the U.S.
experience. By extension, it suggests that the movement toward regu-
latory competition in the EU may be an unwise policy choice. Instead,
278 See, e.g., EDDY WYMEERSCH, COMPANY LAw IN EUROPE AND EUROPEAN COMPANY
LAW 23-24 (Financial Law Inst., Working Paper No. WP-2001-06, 2001) (noting that
some have interpreted Centros as "giv[ing] preference to the incorporation theory over
the seat theory").
279 K.P.M.G. EUROPEAN Bus. CENTRE, STUDY ON TRANSFER OF THE HEAD OFFICE OF
A COMPANY FROM ONE MEMBER STATE TO ANOTHER (1993).
280 VYMEERSCH, supra note 278, at 37 & n.142.
281 See id. at 23 ("[T]he real meaning of the [Centros] case is still controversial,
awaiting further cases to be decided by the Court .... ).
282 For an illustration of the EU legislative process in a related context, see
MICHELLE KALKA & GuHAN SUBRAMANIAN, THE EU TAKEOVER DIRECTWYE (Harvard
Bus. Sch., Note No. N9-902-066, Oct. 26, 2001), which chronicles the EU takeover di-
rective first formally proposed in 1990 and still not yet enacted.
283 WYMEERSCH, supra note 278, at 24-25.
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harmonization may be preferable to mutual recognition of rules in
order to achieve corporate law convergence in the EU .
CONCLUSION
This Article provides empirical evidence on the U.S. corporate
charter marketplace in the 1990s. The primary finding is that manag-
ers generally migrate to (and fail to migrate away from) the typical
state antitakeover statutes. As a result, states that pass these statutes
do well in the corporate charter marketplace (e.g., Nevada), while
states that do not pass them do poorly (e.g., California). Empirical
evidence from the financial economics literature suggests that anti-
takeover statutes reduce shareholder value. Therefore, assuming that
states compete to maximize the number of companies incorporating
within their boundaries (a standard assumption on both sides of the
"race" debate), the pressure to pass antitakeover statutes in order to
attract incorporations seems best characterized as a race to the bot-
tom.
In addition to providing affirmative evidence in' support of a race
to the bottom, this Article challenges prior evidence that has been of-
fered in support of a race to the top. For example, the well-known
migration to Delaware during the 19 9 0 s, characterized by many com-
mentators as evidence of a race to the top, is in large part a move away
from California, a state well known for its greater protection of share-
holder interests than Delaware. Similarly, the high opt-out rate from
the Pennsylvania antitakeover statute is in fact an exception; among
the more typical antitakeover statutes, opt out is extremely rare. Fi-
nally, the evidence that Delaware firms have higher Tobin's Q than
non-Delaware firms is not as stable as prior commentators have as-285
sumed; moreover, others have shown that this result does not neces-
sarily imply a race to the top.286
284 In fact, competition for corporate charters may be a quicker race to the bottom
in Europe than in the U.S., because the forces that have improved corporate govern-
ance in the U.S. have been slower to take hold in Europe, and European countries
have had a long tradition of considering other (nonshareholder) constituencies in
corporate decision making. (One manifestation of this phenomenon, of course, is
German co-determination, under which shareholders and employees have equal rep-
resentation on the "supervisory" board (Aufsichstrat).) In particular, the "overreach-
ing" phenomenon, which may place an important constraint on the race to the bottom
in the United States, may not exist in the EU.
285 Subramanian, supra note 68.
286 See Bar-Gill, Barzuza, & Bebchuk, supra note 66, at 23 ("Findings of Delaware
marginal superiority do not address the question of how well state competition is per-
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While the evidence presented here is generally consistent with a
race to the bottom, I also present evidence suggesting some limits on
this view. Managers migrate to states with typical antitakeover statutes,
but not to the three states with severe antitakeover statutes-Massa-
chusetts, Ohio, and Pennsylvania. This result may be due to improved
corporate governance in the 1990s, which may make these severe stat-
utes "insignificantly redistributive" in the corporate charter market-
place. Thus state legislatures may be overreaching by passing statutes
that go beyond the usual antitakeover protections provided by the
states.
More broadly, this Article sheds additional light on the closely re-
lated debate on federalization of corporate law. The evidence pre-
sented in this Article suggests that, as a matter of public policy, we
cannot rely on the product market, the capital market, or the market
for corporate control to exert pressure on managers so that they mi-
grate away from the typical antitakeover statutes. Instead, the large-
sample evidence shows that managers are able to pursue private bene-
fits of control by moving to states with such statutes. States, in turn,
can be expected to (and do) cater to this interest. A mandatory
choice rule allowing shareholders to select unilaterally their state of
incorporation would be an important step forward in the U.S. charter
market. 8 '7 For the European Union, the findings presented here sug-
gest that the current movement toward increased regulatory competi-
tion may be a poor public policy choice; instead, regulatory harmoni-
zation of corporate law may be the better (if politically more difficult)
solution.
forming overall and, in particular, whether it performs better than would an alterna-
tive regime.").
287 Bebchuk & Ferrell, A New Approach, supra note 6, at 153
* * * * * *
